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SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS NOT A CRIME: 
ALIGNING THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE WITH TITLE VII  
 
Laura T. Kessler* & Sagen Gearhart** 
 
Sexual harassment and sexual assault are ongoing problems in the 
military. The Department of Defense responded in 2019 with sweeping 
changes in how the military handles sexual misconduct, including a proposal 
to criminalize sexual harassment in the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ). This Article, co-authored by an expert on workplace sex 
discrimination and a former military officer, responds to this proposal. We 
argue that sexual harassment, however reprehensible, is not criminal 
conduct. Moreover, criminalization is likely to undermine the military’s 
efforts to prevent and punish sexual harassment by raising the stakes for the 
involved service members, thereby deterring reporting, and by imposing a 
high evidentiary standard. Building on these insights, we propose a set of 
reforms to the UCMJ aimed at aligning the military justice system with civil 
employment discrimination law. These proposals include assigning 
independent authority to investigate and discipline sexual harassment 
outside the chain of command, using administrative actions that employ a 
civil burden of proof to adjudicate sexual harassment complaints, and 
making compensatory damages available to service members for economic 
and psychological injuries caused by sexual harassment. The military 
maintains that preserving good order and discipline justifies its 
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independence from the reach of civil courts and law. Federal courts have 
obliged by holding that Title VII does not cover uniformed military personnel. 
In exchange for this independence, the military justice system must provide 
the basic protections of the civilian justice system. 
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In the United States, women have held formal positions in the military 
only since World War II.1 It has been a mere forty years since the last branch 
of the military stopped using female-only units.2 Positions in ground combat 
units officially opened to women just six years ago, in 2015.3 This 
groundbreaking decision was the latest in a long line of developments 
 
1 See JUDITH A. BELLAFAIRE, THE WOMEN’S ARMY CORPS: A COMMEMORATION OF WORLD 
WAR II SERVICE 3–5 (1993) (stating that Congress introduced and passed the bill allowing 
women to serve in the military in 1941). 
2 BETTIE J. MORDEN, THE WOMEN’S ARMY CORPS, 1945–1978, at 395–96 (1990). 
3 Andrew Swick & Emma Moore, The (Mostly) Good News on Women in Combat, CTR. FOR 
NEW AM. SECURITY (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-update-
on-the-status-of-women-in-combat [https://perma.cc/J974-NV4L]. 
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diversifying the military, including racial integration beginning in 19484 and 
the 2011 repeal of the policy barring openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual persons 
from military service.5 Through all of these transitions and integrations, 
 
4 See KRISTY N. KAMARCK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44321, DIVERSITY, INCLUSION, AND 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMED SERVICES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
12–15 (2019) (documenting a history of racial segregation and discrimination in the United 
States military and desegregation in the Truman era). Although racial minorities have 
volunteered or been recruited into military service since the American Revolution, the 
military was a racially segregated institution until the mid-twentieth century, justified by 
widely accepted “separate but equal” ideology. Id. at 12. Responding to pressure by civil 
rights leaders to integrate the military, in 1948, President Truman initiated a purposeful 
desegregation effort with Executive Order 9981. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 
4313 (July 28, 1948) (establishing the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and 
Opportunity in the Armed Forces).  
5 See generally Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 
3515 (providing for the repeal of the ban on gay men, lesbians, and bisexual people serving 
openly in the military, to be effective sixty days after the President, Defense Secretary, and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided certification that repeal “is consistent with 
the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting 
and retention.”). Until its repeal in September 2011, America’s “Policy Concerning 
Homosexuality in the Armed Forces,” commonly known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 
provided that:  
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces . . . 
if . . . the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited 
another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . . [,] stated that he or she 
is a homosexual or bisexual . . .[,] [or] has married or attempted to marry 
a person known to be of the same biological sex. 
10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2008). After 2011, the policy change on LGBTQ service was swift and 
consequential. On May 17, 2016, the Senate confirmed Eric Fanning as Secretary of the Army, 
the first openly gay head of a service. Michael S. Schmidt & Charlie Savage, Eric Fanning 
Confirmed as Secretary of the Army, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/05/18/us/eric-fanning-army-secretary.html [https://perma.cc/785Z-SSFQ]. In his role, 
Fanning helped lift restrictions on transgender people serving in the military. Karen Ocamb, 
Army’s Out Leader Eric Fanning Helps Guide End to Trans Military Ban, ADVOCATE (Nov. 
1, 2016, 3:37 PM), https://www.advocate.com/transgender/2016/11/01/armys-out-leader-eric-
fanning-helps-guide-end-trans-military-ban [https://perma.cc/4AFY-GQUK]; see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., DTM 16-005, MILITARY SERVICE OF TRANSGENDER SERVICE MEMBERS, 
ATTACHMENT 1 (June 30, 2016) [hereinafter DTM 16-005] (”Transgender Service members 
will be subject to the same standards as any other Service member of the same gender . . . .”). 
However, after his election, President Trump replaced Fanning and reinstituted the ban on 
transgender individuals serving in the military, which the Supreme Court allowed to go into 
effect without explanation. See Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950, 950 (2019) (“[T]he District 
Court’s December 11, 2017 order granting a preliminary injunction is stayed . . . .”); Lolita C. 
Baldor, Senate Confirms Former Ranger as New Army Secretary, AP NEWS (Sept. 27, 2019) 
https:// apnews.com/article/0b4b666c180e491497ac93e52c44e367 [https://perma.cc/VT79-
ESTJ]. For a general discussion of the legality of the transgender ban and the long arc of 
discrimination against LGBTQ people in the military, see Michele Goodwin & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Transgender Military Ban: Preservation of Discrimination Through 
Transformation, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2019). 
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sexual harassment and sexual assault have remained ongoing problems. 
According to the Department of Defense, an estimated 20,500 service members 
experienced unwanted sexual contact or a penetrative sexual assault in 2018.6 
One in four female service members reported an experience of sexual 
harassment.7 These figures represent a substantial increase from the previous 
survey in 2016,8 and 2019 saw even further increases.9 
In light of the #MeToo movement and recent attention it has brought 
to the failure of institutions such as workplaces and universities to address 
sexual harassment,10 it is worth examining the military’s record in this realm. 
 
6 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL YEAR 
2018, at 3 (2019) [hereinafter DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT], 
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/DoD_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault_in_the_ 
Military.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RX8-QV65]. Of the 20,500 service members reporting that 
they experienced unwanted sexual contact, 13,000, or 63%, were women, even though 
women make up only 16% of active duty service members. Id. 
7 Id. at 9. 
8 Specifically, from 2016 to 2018, reports of unwanted sexual contact increased by 38% and 
sexual harassment by 13%. Id. at 3, 12. 
9 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL 
YEAR 2019, at 6, 12 (2020) [hereinafter DOD FY 2019 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN 
REPORT], https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/30/2002291660/-1/-1/1/1_DEPARTMENT_ 
OF_DEFENSE_FISCAL_YEAR_2019_ANNUAL_REPORT_ON_SEXUAL_ASSAULT
_IN_THE_MILITARY.PDF [https://perma.cc/B7VF-7VF3] (reporting a 3% increase in 
sexual assaults involving service members and a 10% increase in formal sexual harassment 
complaints from 2018 to 2019). 
10 #MeToo is a social and political movement against sexual harassment and sexual abuse. The 
phrase “Me Too” was coined, and the #MeToo movement founded, in 2007 by Tarana Burke, 
a Black woman who had also founded Just Be Inc., a nonprofit organization that helps victims 
of sexual assault and harassment. Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long 
Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-
too-movement-tarana-burke.html [https://perma.cc/Z89L-6CUL]. The #MeToo movement 
spread virally in 2017 after actress Alyssa Milano posted a message on Twitter saying, “if 
you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.” Id. The 
tweet opened the floodgates to twelve million stories of sexual abuse, assault, and harassment on 
Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat, and other social media platforms. Id. The movement led to high-
profile firings, especially in Hollywood, as well as much criticism and backlash. Audrey Carlsen, 
Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel & Zach Wichter, #MeToo 
Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html 
[https://perma.cc/W2LC-G7MV]. The movement also spurred an increase in sexual 
harassment claims in the United States. See Andrew Murphy & Terran Chambers, Litigating 
Harassment in the #MeToo Era, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2019, at 13 (“The attention to sexual 
harassment coincided with a less publicized but steady uptick in the number of sexual harassment 
allegations in the workplace . . . .”); U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Press Release, EEOC 
Releases Preliminary FY 2018 Sexual Harassment Data, EEOC.GOV (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www. 
eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releases-preliminary-fy-2018-sexual-harassment-data [https://perma. 
cc/YLC8-3H9F] (“[C]harges filed with the EEOC alleging sexual harassment increased by 
more than 12 percent from fiscal year 2017.”).  
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This issue is more urgent than ever, with more women serving in the military 
than at any time in our country’s history. In 2017, women made up 16% of 
the overall active duty force, compared with 9% in 1980 and just 1% in 
1970.11 The historic transformation of the military in 2015 allowing women 
to serve in combat positions12 officially opened about 220,000 military jobs 
to women.13 Women can now “drive tanks, fire mortars and lead infantry 
soldiers into combat. They [are] able to serve as Army Rangers and Green 
Berets, Navy SEALs, Marine Corps infantry, Air Force parajumpers and 
everything else that was previously open only to men.”14 Yet, sexual 
harassment negatively affects women’s entry into these elite combat units 
and their performance within them. Moreover, the policy change admitting 
women to one of the military’s last bastions15 of male exclusivity and 
supremacy has sparked debate and resistance from within the military,16 
 
11 Amanda Barroso, The Changing Profile of the U.S. Military: Smaller in Size, More Diverse, 
More Women in Leadership, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/ 
fact-tank/2019/09/10/the-changing-profile-of-the-u-s-military/ [https://perma.cc/R6NR-6VZU]. 
The percentage of officers who are women has also steadily grown since the 1970s; in 2017, 
women represented 18% of commissioned officers, up from 5% in 1975. Id. See also OFF. 
UNDER SEC’Y DEF. FOR PERSONNEL & READINESS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., POPULATION 
REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY SERVICES: FISCAL YEAR 2018 SUMMARY REPORT, at 37 
& APP. D, tbl.D-19 [hereinafter DOD FY 2018 POPULATION REP.], https://www.cna.org/ 
research/pop-rep [https://perma.cc/85S3-TM4A] (choose “FY 2018 Executive Summary”) 
(reporting the same numbers for 2018). 
12 See Swick & Moore, supra note 3. 
13 Matthew Rosenberg & Dave Philipps, All Combat Roles Now Open to Women, Defense 
Secretary Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/politics/ 
combat-military-women-ash-carter.html [https://perma.cc/XD3P-RV83]. “Officially” is used 
here, because, in fact, women have been placed into combat situations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq since 2001. Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Of course, the ultimate last bastion of male exclusivity is male-only draft registration. See 
50 U.S.C. § 3802(a) (“[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and 
every other male person residing in the United States, who . . . is between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration.”). 
16 The Marine Corps requested a waiver from the decision for certain front-line combat jobs—
which was denied—and statistics suggest that the Marine Corps has dragged its feet integrating 
women into combat positions. Kate Germano, Opinion, Separate is Not Equal in the Marine 
Corps, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/sunday-review/ 
marine-corps-women-segregation.html [https://perma.cc/ 9QXJ-UQBM]; Hope Hodge Seck, 
Overruled on Women in Combat, Marine Corps Prepares to Integrate Units, MILITARY.COM 
(Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/12/03/overruled-on-women-in-
combat-marine-corps-prepares-to-integrate.html [https://perma.cc/Z2UA-P45B] (“The U.S. 
Marine Corps lost its bid to keep some combat fields closed to women . . . .”); Shawn Snow, 
Where Are the Female Marines?, MARINE CORPS TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.marine 
corpstimes.com/news/2018/03/05/where-are-the-female-marines/ [https://perma.cc/4WVF-
CWG4] (“The Marines were the only branch to ask for a waiver when the Pentagon ended 
the policy that excluded women from combat jobs.”). 
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Congress,17 and the general public,18 exposing the negative attitudes about 
women’s service that make addressing sexual assault and harassment so 
difficult. For example, such hostility was on display in 2019, when it was 
discovered that some 30,000 active duty and veteran Marines had used a 
private Facebook group called “Marines United” to share thousands of nude 
photographs of female service members.19  
In the past decade, the Department of Defense has worked to advance 
a military culture free from sexual assault and harassment, making 
considerable investments in policies and actions to prevent and respond to 
sexual misconduct.20 Among other actions, the Department of Defense has 
increased its training, data collection, and reporting on sexual assault and 
harassment in the military and has proposed adding sexual harassment as a 
criminal offense in the military penal code. Yet, it seems these efforts have 
not borne fruit; indeed, sadly, sexual assault and harassment in the military 
grew markedly worse during the Trump administration.21 
As we articulate in this Article, the military’s responses to the 
#MeToo movement, although well-intentioned, are at once too punitive and 
too meager. Making sexual harassment a crime could raise the stakes for the 
involved service members (both the alleged perpetrator and victim) and 
thereby deter reporting and resolution of incidents of sexual misconduct. 
Criminalizing workplace sexual harassment, which is a serious yet distinct 
phenomenon from rape and sexual assault, is also out of step with established 
Supreme Court doctrine on sexual harassment in civilian workplaces, which 
 
17 For example, the decision to allow women to serve in combat positions was immediately 
blasted by Congressperson Duncan Hunter, R-Cal., a member of the House Armed Services 
Committee, who alleged the policy change would erode the ability of the military to fight. 
Tom Vanden Brook & Jim Michaels, Military Will Open All Combat Jobs to Women, 
Defense Secretary Announces, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2015, 9:07 PM), https://www.usatoday. 
com/story/news/nation/2015/12/03/women-in-combat-defense-secretary-ash-carter/ 
76719938/ [https://perma.cc/HJH6-TN7N]. 
18 The Center for Military Readiness, a nonprofit organization opposed to gender integration 
of combat units and service by gay and transgender people, argues that integrating women 
endangers male morale and military performance, leads to sexual assaults on female service 
members, and decreases military effectiveness. Are Military Social Experiments Increasing 
Sexual Assaults on Men and Women?, CTR. FOR MIL. READINESS (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://www.cmrlink.org/issues/full/are-military-social-experiments-increasing-sexual-
assaults-on-men-and-women [https://perma.cc/ER2K-YKEH]. 
19 See Paul Szoldra, An Internal Investigation Spurred by a Nude Photo Scandal Shows Just 
How Deep Sexism Runs in the Marine Corps, TASK & PURPOSE (Dec 4, 2019, 4:27 PM), 
https://taskandpurpose.com/marines-united-study [https://perma.cc/42TY-XNKS] (“[S]ome 
30,000 active-duty Marines and veterans . . . shared thousands of nude photographs of female 
Marines, and in some cases cyber-stalked them, revealing personal details and describing 
where the women worked and lived on base.”). 
20 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
21 See sources cited supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
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emphasizes prevention rather than punishment, however imperfect that 
framework may be.22 Furthermore, criminalization is at odds with the latest 
feminist thinking about the most effective responses to sexual violence and 
harassment, which has centered around the idea that more collaborative, less 
adversarial responses can more productively address the cultural and 
systemic nature of sex discrimination within institutions.23 
Yet, there is no question that sexual harassment in the military is a 
serious, ongoing problem that requires a response. Training and data 
 
22 This preventive approach, particularly the affirmative defense shielding employers from 
liability for workplace sexual harassment, has been critiqued by employment discrimination 
and critical legal scholars. See, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 168–215 (2016) (discussing the origins of the 
affirmative defense in sexual harassment cases and how courts, in applying the defense, 
equate “symbolic structures” such as ineffective antiharassment policies with legal 
compliance); Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of 
Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 312–25 (2001) (discussing the mismatch between the 
affirmative defense, which requires victims to report sexual harassment or risk losing their 
claims, and the many rational reasons that victims do no report sexual harassment); L. 
Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 
IND. L.J. 711, 733 (2007) (“[E]xpecting women to react to sexually harassing conduct in a 
way that is different than the manner in which they have been socialized . . . punishes women 
for acting in precisely the ways that they are generally expected to act.”); Tanya Katerí 
Hernández, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment & 
the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1244–45 (2006) 
(discussing both that harassers disproportionately target women of color because of their 
heightened vulnerability in the workplace and that women of color are less likely to report 
sexual harassment than are white women); Laura T. Kessler, Employment Discrimination 
and the Domino Effect, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1048 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has carved out a broad affirmative defense to employer liability for sexual harassment that, 
in practical effect, requires victims of harassment to report in virtually all circumstances or 
risk losing their claims.”). 
23 See, e.g., LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED 
POLICY APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 97 (2018) [hereinafter GOODMARK, 
DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE] (“[T]he criminal legal system can deliver only 
punishment, which does not provide some people with the reparation they seek . . . . Although 
the United States has largely rejected the use of restorative justice . . . the rest of the world 
has not been as hesitant.”); Julie Goldscheid, #MeToo, Sexual Harassment and 
Accountability: Considering the Role of Restorative Approaches, 36 OHIO ST. J. DISP. 
RESOL. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3645439 [https://perma.cc/J4QT-ETRA] (“The adversarial character of anti-
discrimination law imposes high costs, both economic and psychological, on plaintiffs . . . .”); 
see also Leigh Goodmark, Opinion, Stop Treating Domestic Violence Differently From 
Other Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019) [hereinafter Goodmark, Stop Treating Domestic 
Violence Differently], https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/opinion/domestic-violence-
criminal-justice-reform-too.html [https://perma.cc/ 62ZH-VJ6D] (“The effectiveness of the 
criminal legal response to domestic violence is a sensitive subject. Questioning it is a harder 
sell politically than reconsidering our responses to drug or property crimes. But intimate 
partner violence should be included in criminal justice reforms.”). 
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collection without more fundamental institutional changes will fall short of 
what is necessary to address the United States military’s serious sexual 
misconduct problem, especially given the organization’s discriminatory 
culture that devalues women. 
This conflict between the clear need for a tougher response to sexual 
harassment in the military and concerns about the potential harms of 
criminalization poses a dilemma. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,24 
the federal law that prohibits employment discrimination based on sex and 
sexual orientation, does not apply to uniformed members of the Armed 
Forces.25 Rather, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is the federal 
law that forms the foundation of the military justice system.26 If sexual 
harassment is to be addressed in the military justice system, it must be 
through criminal law. The UCMJ is a criminal code of justice; there is no 
civil legal system in the military. Some have argued for unification, whereby 
Title VII would apply to military service members, but this is unrealistic. The 
federal courts have long held that Title VII does not apply to the Armed 
Forces, and Congress has not disrupted this interpretation of Title VII. 
 With these tensions and realities in mind, this Article explores a 
middle ground: reforming the military justice system to better align with civil 
employment discrimination law on sexual harassment. This approach raises 
a range of complex legal problems, including the need to decide what body 
of law, burden of proof, procedures, and remedies will control criminal sexual 
harassment prosecutions in the military. While we cannot hope to present a 
fully redesigned UCMJ in the scope of one Article, we begin here to sketch 
the contours of a modernized UCMJ. The military justice system has already 
undergone significant “civilianization” over time;27 it can and should be 
pushed further to reflect civilian antidiscrimination norms. 
Although our attention turns primarily to sexual harassment in this 
Article, we also speak to the collective concerns about sex-based harms 
generally, including rape and sexual assault. In doing so, we acknowledge 
that there is a spectrum of sexual harms in the military and that a culture of 
hostility toward women’s service forms the foundation for most sexual 
harms. Importantly, we also acknowledge that sexual misconduct in the 
military affects service members of all gender identities and sexual 
orientations. Therefore, although we focus primarily on women, male service 
members identifying as gay or bisexual and transgender service members 
should benefit from the analysis and reforms presented in this Article, even 
 
24 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 717(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(a). 
25 See discussion infra notes 172–176 and accompanying text. 
26 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946. 
27 See Edward F. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REV. 3 passim 
(1970) (recounting the growth and development of the civilianization of military justice, 
beginning in World War I). 
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if their experiences of sexual violence may not be perfectly coextensive with 
those of female service members. 
 Part I situates sexual harassment and assault in the military within the 
military’s history and place in America, discussing the potential role of the 
military to foster social integration and equality in American society. 
 Part II provides an overview of sexual misconduct in the military and 
evaluates the military’s insufficient response. Specifically, Section II.A 
examines statistics from the military’s latest internal surveys on sexual 
harassment and assault, which demonstrate that the Department of Defense 
is still struggling to reduce rates of sexual misconduct in the military. We also 
discuss the persistence of a culture both inside and outside the military that 
devalues female members’ service, particularly their participation in ground 
combat units. Section II.B analyzes the military’s “CATCH” program, which 
gives sexual assault victims the option of anonymously disclosing the 
identifying information of alleged perpetrators to aid in the identification of 
repeat offenders, as well as the DOD’s announced proposal to add a penal 
article to the UCMJ directly criminalizing sexual harassment. Section II.C 
details the inadequacies of these responses. Although CATCH and 
criminalization may appear to be bold steps, our analysis demonstrates that 
these initiatives fall short. At best, they mask deeper, structural problems in 
the military justice system’s responses to sexual assault and harassment; at 
worst, they undermine the DOD’s efforts in this area. 
 Finally, Part III turns to solutions. We outline an updated regulatory 
framework for the UCMJ that that would bring the military’s legal response 
to sexual harassment in closer alignment with civil employment 
discrimination law. These proposals include assigning independent authority 
to investigate and discipline sexual harassment outside the chain of 
command, using administrative actions that employ a preponderance of the 
evidence standard to adjudicate sexual harassment complaints, and making 
compensatory damages available to victims for economic and psychological 
injuries caused by sexual harassment. For the most part, all of these reforms 
can be implemented within the parameters of the military justice system, 
balancing the military’s desire to remain independent of civilian courts and 
law with the rights of service members to be free of discrimination. 
 
I. THE MILITARY, EQUALITY, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 
 
As we argue in this Part, eliminating discrimination and sexual 
misconduct in the military has broad implications for American society. 
Participation in this central American institution is a marker of full 
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citizenship.28 The military is also one of the United States’ largest and most 
influential employers. In 2020, there were roughly 1.35 million men and 
women serving on active duty.29 Service members are tasked with cooperating 
with one another, often over extended periods, and in diverse groups that at 
least aspirationally place everyone on the same plane irrespective of racial, 
ethnic, or sexual hierarchies. This aspiration, however incompletely realized, 
makes the military an institution with significant potential to foster equality in 
American society.30  
The military has played a uniquely integrative function in our country. 
At the same time, it has also served as a site of struggle over civil, women’s, and 
LGBTQ rights and continues to reflect institutionalized inequalities. This 
Section discusses this history, highlighting the military’s potential as an engine 
of equality in American society, despite its historical and continuing challenges.  
 
A. Civil Rights 
 
The American civil rights movement arguably gained momentum 
because of the American people’s close relationship with military service.31 
During World War II, America faced the racist ideology of the Nazis. This 
 
28 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 415 (1857) (“[W]hy are the African 
race, born in the State, not permitted to share in one of the highest duties of the citizen? . . . 
[H]e is not, by the institutions and laws of the State, numbered among its people . . . . [He] 
is not therefore called on to uphold and defend it.”); Jane Dailey, The Sexual Politics of Race 
in World War II America, in FOG OF WAR: THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 145, 149 (Kevin M. Kruse & Stephen Tuck eds., 2012) [hereinafter FOG OF WAR] 
(“The connection between bearing arms in defense of a community and being vested with full 
rights within it . . . ha[s] been linked in America since the nation’s founding.”); see also 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the 
Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1550 (2010) (“Dred Scott expressly equated 
disarmament with enslavement and lack of citizenship.”). 
29 DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTH 
REPORT (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp [https://perma.cc/ 
QW4S-8K34] (choose “October 2020” from “Active Duty Military Personnel by Service by 
Rank/Grade (Updated Monthly)”). Including civilian military personnel, the Department of 
Defense claims 3.2 million employees on its roster. Henry Taylor, Who is the World’s 
Biggest Employer? The Answer Might Not Be What You Expect, WORLD ECON. F. (June 17, 
2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/06/worlds-10-biggest-employers/?link=mktw 
[https://perma.cc/35MP-C5G6]. 
30 See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and 
the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 25 (2000) (“The idea of compelling people to get along may sound 
paradoxical and potentially counterproductive. But the success of integration in the armed 
forces—probably the most successful natural experiment in institutional integration that this 
country has seen—suggests that people can in fact be ordered to get along.”). 
31 See Robert P. Saldin, Strange Bedfellows: War and Minority Rights, 173 WORLD AFF. 57, 
57 (2011) (“War, what is it good for? Well, minority rights for one thing . . . . Minority 
groups that have contributed to war efforts have been rewarded with expanded rights.”). 
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encounter exposed America’s own problem with racism, making segregation 
at home increasingly untenable.32 In 1946, in response to an increase in racial 
violence and tension across the United States, President Truman established 
a Commission on Civil Rights.33 Among other recommendations, the 
Commission suggested desegregating the military.34 The Commission’s final 
report, entitled To Secure These Rights, highlighted the close relationship 
between racial segregation in the military and unequal social conditions for 
African Americans in American society, observing: 
[A]ny discrimination which, while imposing an obligation, 
prevents members of minority groups from rendering full 
military service in defense of their country is for them a 
peculiarly humiliating badge of inferiority. The nation also 
suffers a loss of manpower and is unable to marshal maximum 
strength at a moment when such strength is most needed.35 
Noting that “[t]he war experience brought to our attention a laboratory in 
which we may prove that the majority and minorities of our population can 
train and work and fight side by side in cooperation and harmony,” the 
Commission urged that “[w]e should not hesitate to take full advantage of 
this opportunity.”36 President Truman did so by executive order, not believing 
Congress would pass a bill to integrate the military.37 Thus, the process of 
  
 
32 Id. at 59 (“World War II . . . undermined racial supremacism in America . . . . [T]he US 
had a weakness in that its denunciations of Hitler’s racist ideology were blatantly hypocritical 
in the face of Jim Crow. This awkward fact led to increased attention on ‘the color line’ . . . 
.”); see also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 9 (2000) (“The purpose of the war would leave its victors with new 
obligations. And if the war was, at least in part, a battle against racism, then racial segregation 
and disenfranchisement seemed to belie the great sacrifices the war had wrought.”); Harvard 
Sitkoff, African Americans, American Jews, and the Holocaust, in THE ACHIEVEMENT OF 
AMERICAN LIBERALISM: THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACIES 181, 181–96 (William Chafe ed. 
2003) (reviewing how the horrors of the Holocaust and the United States’ involvement in 
World War II proved central to the development of the civil rights movement). 
33 Exec. Order No. 9808, 11 Fed. Reg. 14,153 (Dec. 7, 1946). 
34 DUDZIAK, supra note 32, at 84–86; KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 14; see also Lisa Vox, How 
Executive Order 9981 Desegregated the U.S. Military, THOUGHTCO. (Oct. 18, 2019), https:// 
www.thoughtco.com/executive-order-9981-us-military-desegregation-45360 [https://perma.cc/ 
765U-XZYJ]. 
35 PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIV. RTS., TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 8 (1947). 
36 Id. at 47. 
37 See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948): (“It is hereby declared to be 
the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all 
persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This 
policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to 
effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.”). The order also 
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integrating the United States Armed Forces officially began in 1948.38 
 Some military leaders39 and rank-and-file service members resisted 
the order, and de facto segregation persisted for some time.40 However, 
political scientists and historians frequently cite African American service 
during World War II as a chapter in our country’s history that significantly 
shaped the civil rights movement.41 The military was one of the first testing 
grounds and victories of the modern civil-rights era.42 According to historians, 
in the decades after World War II, the United States military became one of the 
most racially diverse institutions in the country, offering social mobility to 
generations of Black Americans. 
 The potentially positive influence of the military on racial equality in 
the United States continues to the present. For example, in 2003, the military 
played a leading role in advocating for affirmative action in higher education. 
In Grutter v. Bollinger,43 a Supreme Court case addressing the constitutionality 
of race-conscious law school admissions at the University of Michigan, 
several former top military officials filed an amicus brief arguing that “a 
highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and trained to 
command our nation’s racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to the 
military's ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national  
 
established the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the 
Armed Forces, tasked with studying the potential impact of integration on military 
efficiency. See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 14. 
38 Most of the actual enforcement of the order was accomplished by President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s administration from 1953–1961, including the desegregation of military 
schools, hospitals, and bases. The last of the all-Black units in the United States military was 
abolished in September 1954. DAVID A. NICHOLS, A MATTER OF JUSTICE: EISENHOWER AND 
THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 42–50 (2007). 
39 See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 14 (“[S]ome military leaders [on Truman’s commission] 
advocated for maintaining the status quo due to concerns about inefficiencies that might arise 
from ‘impaired morale in mixed units.’”).  
40 See DUDZIAK, supra note 32, at 87 (discussing resistance to racial integration well into the 
1950s); Craig Westergard, Note, You Catch More Flies with Honey: Reevaluating the 
Erroneous Premises of the Military Exception to Title VII, 20 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. 
WELFARE L. REV. 215, 219 (2019) (noting that Black service members were consistently 
assigned to low skill jobs and had limited roles in the infantry until the 1960s); cf. Jason 
Morgan Ward, “A War for States’ Rights”: The White Supremacist Vision of Double Victory, 
in FOG OF WAR, supra note 28, at 126–44 (discussing racial violence in and around integrated 
Southern military bases in the 1940s). 
41 See, e.g., Saldin, supra note 31, at 66 (“African American service in World War II and 
Korea helped shape the evolving civil rights movement.”).  
42 See Kevin M. Kruse & Stephen Tuck, Introduction, in FOG OF WAR, supra note 28, at 4 
(“African Americans demanded equal rights in return for their contribution to the defense 
economy, their loyalty to the war effort, and their sacrifices as soldiers—and as mothers and 
wives of soldiers.”). 
43 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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security.”44 Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, embraced the 
argument, noting that the “most selective institutions,” including military 
academies and flagship state universities, are “training ground[s]” for leaders, 
and, therefore, “must remain both diverse and selective.”45 The justices 
repeatedly referenced the military brief during oral argument,46 and the 
Court’s majority opinion upholding the policy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment contained more citations to the military brief than to any of the 
more than one hundred other briefs submitted to the Court.47 
This history of the military’s role in American race relations is an 
admittedly complex story. We do not wish to paint an overly sanguine picture 
of racial progress in the military or to downplay the military’s continuing 
challenges in the realm of meaningful diversity. The racial integration of the 
military was the culmination of a long period of Black protest, that is, of the 
“long civil rights movement.”48 It did not spring into being overnight or 
necessarily emerge from a widespread epiphany of race consciousness by 
white people. Abundant exemplary scholarship also recounts the American 
military’s central place in colonial conquest,49 even as the military was 
 
44 Consol. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 
1787554, at *5. 
45 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331, 332. 
46 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–10, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241), 2003 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 26. 
47 Jonathan Groner, In ‘Grutter v. Bollinger’ Amicus Avalanche, One Brief Stood Out, LEGAL 
TIMES (July 2, 2003, 12:00 AM) http://www.law.com/almID/900005535864/ [https://perma. 
cc/893L-QGPA]. 
48 See Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the 
Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233, 1235 (2005) (telling a “truer” story of the “long civil rights 
movement” that “took root in the liberal and radical milieu of the late 1930s, was intimately 
tied to the ‘rise and fall of the New Deal Order,’ accelerated during World War II, stretched 
far beyond the South, was continuously and ferociously contested, and, in the 1960s and 
1970s, inspired a ‘movement of movements’ that ‘def[ies] any narrative of collapse.”). 
49 See, e.g., ODD ARNE WESTAD, THE GLOBAL COLD WAR: THIRD WORLD INTERVENTIONS 
AND THE MAKING OF OUR TIMES 396 (2007) (“[T]he Cold War was a continuation of 
colonialism through slightly different means.”); Bruce Cumings, The Wicked Witch of the 
West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East, in THE END OF THE COLD WAR: ITS 
MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS 90 (Michael J. Hogan ed., 1992) (“[W]hat the Cold War was 
really about for Americans [was] interventions in the Third World, from Korea through Iran, 
Guatemala and Cuba, to the debacle in Vietnam."); Penny Von Eschen, Civil Rights and 
World War II in a Global Frame: Shape-Shifting Racial Formations and the U.S. Encounter 
with European and Japanese Colonialism, in FOG OF WAR, supra note 28, at 182 (“[T]he 
term ‘cold war’ [is] a misnomer for the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the 
Middle East, where democratic challenges often met with violent suppression by either 
[U.S.] proxies or covert operatives, or both.”). There are numerous works examining the 
military’s role in American colonial history in specific contexts. See, e.g., KEVIN K. GAINES, 
AMERICAN AFRICANS IN GHANA: BLACK EXPATRIATES AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2006); 
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promoting racial equality in its ranks at home.50 Finally, we would be remiss 
not to acknowledge the Department of Defense’s recent involvement in the 
militarization of the police and the dispersal of the Black Lives Matter protests.51 
As these examples demonstrate, there is no straight line from racial integration 
to antiracism; rather, more often than not, organizational reform has yielded new 
forms of racism and racial thinking. Nevertheless, we think the history 
summarized here demonstrates that the military, as an institution with a central 
role in defining American citizenship, has the potential to promote broader 
equality in American society. As such, it is an institution that should be of special 
concern when thinking through societal responses to sexual harassment. 
 
B. Women’s Rights 
 
As with racial integration, the history of women in the military 
suggests a connection between women’s integration in the military and 
gender equity in the civilian sector. 
While women fought in our nation’s conflicts from the very 
beginning,52 they were not given formal roles in the Armed Forces until 
World War II.53 Women participated in some branches of the military as early 
as the turn of the twentieth century, serving primarily as nurses and in clerical 
occupations.54 Traditional, sexist attitudes excluded them from other 
occupations.55 This pattern of exclusion changed substantially during World 
War II, when many military occupations opened to women, including “airplane 
mechanics, air traffic controllers, instructors and other specializations with the 
 
DOUGLAS LITTLE, AMERICAN ORIENTALISM: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
SINCE 1945 (3d ed. 2008); MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE VIETNAM WARS: 1945–1990 (1991). 
50 See DUDZIAK, supra note 32, at 12–14 (discussing the connections between domestic civil 
rights reform and America’s military activities promoting democracy around the world 
during the Cold War). 
51 See, e.g., Paul D. Shinkman, Trump Tests the U.S. Commitment to an Apolitical Military, 
U.S. NEWS (June 8, 2020, 6:53 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/ 
2020-06-08/trump-tests-the-us-commitment-to-an-apolitical-military [https://perma.cc/9TYK-
UKXH] (discussing President Trump’s threat to deploy the U.S. military against Black Lives 
Matter protesters). 
52 See Linda Grant De Pauw, Women in Combat: The Revolutionary War Experience, 7 ARMED 
FORCES & SOC’Y 209, 210 (1981) (noting that an estimated 20,000 women served in the 
Colonial Army in the Revolutionary war, with several hundred serving as uniformed 
combatants); Kaia Danyluk, Women’s Service with the Revolutionary Army, COLONIAL 
WILLIAMSBURG INTERPRETER, Fall 1997, at 8–13, https://cwfpublications.omeka.net/ 
items/show/84 [https://perma.cc/SYU5-E4ZB] (describing the role of female “camp followers” 
in the Colonial Army). 
53 See BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 3–5.  
54 See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 23. 
55 Id. 
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exception of direct combat roles,” and a small group of women even served as 
pilots in a special sex-segregated unit of the Air Force.56  
After observing the contribution of female civilian contract workers 
in the First World War, Congresswoman Edith Rogers of Massachusetts 
introduced a bill in 1941 to establish a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps 
(WAAC).57 Army Leadership did not want women to be fully integrated into 
the Regular Army. Therefore, as a compromise, the WAAC was established 
as a separate entity designed to work “with” the Army rather than as a part of 
it.58 Support for the bill came in large part as a result of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor and the prospect of a war on two fronts.59 Military generals feared 
there would be manpower shortages.60 Rather than spend time training men, 
they decided it would be more efficient to place already highly-skilled 
women in essential service jobs like switchboard operations and typing.61 
Congress approved the bill on May 14, 1941, and it was signed into law by 
President Roosevelt.62 
Resistance to the integration of women into the Armed Forces 
emerged from the beginning. In 1943, the wartime Office of Censorship, an 
agency charged with reviewing soldiers’ mail, noted that 84% of letters 
mentioning the WAAC were unfavorable.63 Male soldiers tended to question 
the morals of women in military service, and “male folklore” held that 
WAACs were prostitutes assigned to “keep men happy.”64 Negative 
perceptions of women in military service spilled into the civilian sphere, 
making WAAC recruitment more difficult.65 Anti-WAAC perceptions derived 
from the commonly held view that women should not serve in traditionally 
male organizations. Moreover, male soldiers’ families were not anxious for 
their sons, husbands, and brothers to be “freed” from more comfortable 
military jobs for combat.66  
 Women in the WAAC were not treated as equal members of the 
Armed Forces, even though they were permitted to serve overseas. Because 
they were not part of the Regular Army, they were ineligible for retirement 
 
56 Id. at 24. 
57 Id. at 23. 
58 BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 3–4.  
59 See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 23. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 5. 
63 Id. at 16. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., id. at 4–5 (noting statements of a congressman opposing the WAAC, who asked: 
“Who will then do the cooking, the washing, the mending, the humble homey tasks to which 
every woman has devoted herself; who will nurture the children?”); id. at 16–17 (discussing 
resentment of soldiers’ and their families toward the WAACs). 
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or veterans’ benefits.67 They served mostly under temporary arrangements 
and under restrictive policies;68 in essence, they were an auxiliary resource.69 
 Following World War II, Congress finally ended women’s exclusion 
from formal military service with the passage of the Women’s Armed 
Services Integration Act of 1948,70 giving them a permanent place in the 
military. The Act, however, also imposed quotas limiting the proportion of 
women to 2% of the enlisted force and 10% of officers71 and instituted 
unequal treatment for women in other respects.72  
Some branches of the military were quicker than others in disbanding 
their female-only components. For example, the Navy disbanded its female-
only reserve branch or the “WAVES” (Women Accepted for Volunteer 
Emergency Service) in 1948.73 In contrast, the Army maintained the female-
only Women’s Army Corps (WAC) (the Regular Army successor to the 
 
67 See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 23; see also BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining 
that WAACs were not provided with overseas pay, life insurance, medical coverage, or death 
benefits granted to Regular Army soldiers, and that female WAACs officers officially 
received less pay than male officers of similar rank). 
68 ELLEN C. COLLIER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IB79045, WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES CRS-2 
(1982). 
69 In 1943, due to the success of the WAAC, the Army asked Congress for authorization to 
integrate the WAAC as a component of the Regular Army. With this integration, women 
would serve as actual, if segregated, members of the Armed Forces in the Women’s Army Corps 
(WAC). Creation of the Women’s Army Corps, ARMY.MIL: WOMEN IN THE ARMY, 
https://www.army.mil/ women/history/wac.html [https://perma.cc/A8TE-BENX] (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2020). As such, one may argue that the WAC was the precursor to Congress’s 
largescale integration of women in 1948. 
70 Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 356; see also MORDEN, supra note 2, at 48. 
71 KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 24. The officer quota excluded nurses. Id. at 24 n.122. 
72 Specifically:  
[W]omen required parental consent for enlistment under the age of 21 (the 
age of consent was 18 for men); women could not hold a permanent rank 
above lieutenant colonel/commander . . . [and] male spouses had to 
demonstrate dependency in order to receive female servicemembers’ 
dependent’s benefits and/or the female servicemember had to be the family’s 
primary source of support for her children to be considered dependents. 
Id. at 24. Around this time, the military also developed guidelines for investigating 
homosexuality among women soldiers and stepped up investigations of alleged lesbians. See 
MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 180–84 (2009). Canaday argues that the lesbian witch hunts were closely 
related to generalized anxieties about gender in the military following women’s permanent 
integration; that is, the military engaged in widespread investigations of alleged female 
homosexuality to “police[] . . . women in the service as a class.” Id. at 213. 
73 Naval Hist. & Heritage Command Commc’n & Outreach Div., The First Waves, THE 
SEXTANT (July 29, 2016), https://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/2016/07/29/the-first-
waves/ [https://perma.cc/LZJ9-Q2FZ].  
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WAAC)74 until 1978.75 By this time, maintaining a segregated, female-only 
branch of the Army was widely viewed as discriminatory, even by the 
Department of Defense, which drafted the legislation abolishing the WAC.76  
Once assimilated into the Armed Forces, the military still prohibited 
women from serving in combat arms units.77 Such units included Infantry, 
Special Forces, Armor, and Artillery. These units have the primary function 
of engaging enemy forces in direct combat. Under the combat exclusion 
policy, women were limited to occupations like Transportation, Ordnance, 
Quartermaster, Military Intelligence, or Military Police, whose purpose is to 
provide ancillary or supporting services. The combat exclusion policy had 
existed since women started service in World War II, primarily due to 
conceptions deeming it inappropriate for women to engage in combat.78 
 Despite resistance to women’s full integration into the Armed Forces, 
women’s involvement in World War II presented a far-reaching challenge to 
systemic sex discrimination in American society. Integration allowed women 
to prove their abilities so that civilian employers were “hard-pressed to deny 
jobs to women solely because of sex.”79 
As labor historians have documented, women’s involvement in the 
wartime labor force during World War II also contributed to their economic 
gains and integration into traditionally male-dominated workplaces and 
occupations.80 When men went off to war by the millions, women stepped 
into the civilian and war economy jobs that men left behind, taking their place 
on assembly lines and in defense plants for aircraft manufacturers, 
 
74 On July 1, 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Public Law 78-110, which converted the 
auxiliary WAAC to the WAC, making it a part of the Regular Army and giving full benefits 
to women. See Creation of the Women’s Army Corps, supra note 69; Act of July 1, 1943, ch. 
187, Pub. L. No. 78-110, 57 Stat. 371. 
75 MORDEN, supra note 2, at 395–97. 
76 Id. at 395–96 (reporting broad acceptance of the legislation abolishing the WAC by the 
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, active and retired WACS, and Congress, and 
that one Senator stated, in support, “‘Imagine . . . a separate personnel system for Blacks or 
Catholics or Chicanos. The country would not stand for such a thing.’”). 
77 Id. at 128; Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 356. 
78 See BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the suitability of women for noncombatant jobs). 
79 ROBERT L. GOLDICH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NO. 80-27F, WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES: 
PROCEEDINGS OF A CRS SEMINAR HELD ON NOVEMBER 2, 1979 AND SELECTED READINGS 
(1980). This is not to diminish the fact that even formal sex discrimination in the workplace 
continued into the 1970s. See KATHERINE TURK, EQUALITY ON TRIAL: GENDER AND RIGHTS 
IN THE MODERN AMERICAN WORKPLACE 110 (2016) (discussing ongoing union campaigns 
to address pay equity, sexual harassment, job training, childcare, and job safety in the 1970s); 
id. at 126 (“In the late 1970s, nearly half of working women were in occupations that were 
at least 75 percent female . . . .”). 
80 See generally KAREN ANDERSON, WARTIME WOMEN: SEX ROLES, FAMILY RELATIONS, AND 
THE STATUS OF WOMEN DURING WORLD WAR II (1981) (exploring the impacts of World War II 
on the occupational distribution of women and their long-term economic advancement). 
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automakers, shipbuilders, and steelmakers, for example.81 They were pressed 
into service as taxi drivers, shuttling injured sailors from Navy ships to 
hospitals in cities like Seattle.82 Women of all walks of life joined the civilian 
workforce in blue and white collar jobs, ranging from streetcar operators, 
construction workers, and agricultural workers to government and office 
workers.83 All in all, an estimated six million women joined the civilian 
workforce during World War II.84 
 Ultimately, the war did not fundamentally transform women’s status in 
American society.85 Women’s workplace presence was met with resistance by 
employers and unions.86 After the war, both private and public employers pushed 
women out of the workplace87 and back into the home.88 Moreover, because 
 
81 Id. at 6. 
82 Susan Paynter, As WWII Raged, Seattle’s First Female Cab Drivers Made History, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER (March 15, 2011, 4:15 PM), https://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/As- 
WWII-raged-Seattle-s-first-female-cab-drivers-1144290.php [https://perma.cc/8CCT-ZF8D]. 
83 Annette McDermott, How World War II Empowered Women, HIST. (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www. 
history.com/news/how-world-war-ii-empowered-women [https://perma.cc/K7N4-4MCL]. 
84 Id. In addition, educational institutions admitted women into traditionally male fields of science, 
medicine, and technology. Locally, women also served on juries for the first time in several states, 
replaced male political party workers, and won election to state offices. See SUSAN M. HARTMANN, 
THE HOME FRONT AND BEYOND: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE 1940s, at 210 (1982).  
85 See ANDERSON, supra note 80, at 173 (“Despite the temporary gains of the war years, 
women’s status within the labor force was not much better than it had been before the war.”). 
86 See id. at 23–31, 35, 44–47, 52–61, 64–65 (documenting how in Seattle, Detroit, and 
Baltimore, for example, employers and unions only reluctantly opened their doors to women, 
especially in previously male-dominated workplaces and occupations). Even worse, Black 
women continued to be objects of discrimination based on race as well as gender. Id. at 36–42.  
87 See id. at 161, 164–69 (discussing reconversion layoffs of women after the war); RUTH 
MILKMAN, ON GENDER, LABOR, AND INEQUALITY 119–38 (2016) (discussing the 
“defeminization of basic industry” at the end of World War II, using the auto industry as a 
case study); Sheila Tobias & Lisa Anderson, What Really Happened to Rosie the Riveter? 
Demobilization and the Female Labor Force, 1944-47, in WOMEN’S AMERICA: REFOCUSING 
THE PAST 354, 354–73 (Linda K. Kerber & Jane De Hart Matthews eds., 1982) (discussing 
private and public discrimination against women workers in the reconversion period and 
suggesting that the war’s liberative potential was thwarted by postwar politics). For 
discussions of the post-war “purges” of women by unions, see Nancy Gabin, Women 
Workers and the UAW in the Post-World War II Period: 1945–1954, 21 LAB. HIST. 5 (1979) 
and Lyn Goldfarb, Separated & Unequal: Discrimination Against Women Workers After 
World War II (The U.A.W. 1944-54) (Women’s Work Project, A Union for Radical Political 
Economics, n.d.) (unpublished pamphlet, on file with Healy Library Archives and Special 
Collections, Univ. Mass., Boston). These works, and others, refute the “turning point” 
theory, which attributes women’s economic gains and increased labor force participation in 
the post-war period to their involvement in the wartime economy. Other scholars, however, 
defend the theory’s salience. See ANDERSON, supra note 80, at 8–10 (discussing 
disagreements among historians and economists over the turning point theory). 
88 ANDERSON, supra note 80, at 175–78; ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: 
AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA 62–70 (1988). Institutions of higher education 
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military service determined eligibility for valuable governmental benefits, it 
helped define deserving (mostly male) and undeserving (mostly female) 
beneficiaries in the post-war welfare state.89 Yet, however temporary, wartime 
opportunities in the civilian labor force contributed to the breakdown of social 
structures relegating women to the home and set the stage for more fundamental 
social changes in gender roles and legal developments in the 1960s.90  
With the women’s rights movement and the shift to an all-volunteer 
force in 1973, women’s integration into the military rapidly accelerated, 
facilitated by Supreme Court decisions,91 federal legislation,92  and policy 
 
reverted to preferring men after the war, with male veterans receiving preference in college 
admissions; women were increasingly present on campuses as wives of male college students 
and departmental clerical workers. See HARTMANN, supra note 84, at 106–07; cf. MAY, 
supra, at 78 (discussing college as a route to marriage for middle-class white women in the 
post-war years; many women dropped out of college upon marrying). 
89 See Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.I. Jane?: Citizenship, Gender, and Social 
Policy in the Postwar Era, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 91, 94 (2002) (“[T]he GI Bill, like the 
Social Security programs, was instrumental in shaping the postwar economy and society by 
reinforcing traditional gender norms in its distribution of benefits.”). This dynamic played 
out inside the military as well. See JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, THE RISE OF THE MILITARY 
WELFARE STATE 117–31 (2015) (tracing the demise of robust military social welfare benefits 
to the influx of women, minorities, and poorer service members in the early years of the all-
volunteer military; conservative critics, echoing attacks on welfare recipients, painted the 
new soldiers as a class of freeloaders). 
90 See ANDERSON, supra note 80, at 174 (“The influx of large numbers of married women 
into the labor force marked an important turning point for women, involving as it did the 
implicit rejection of the idea that a woman’s household responsibilities could not be 
reconciled with outside employment.”); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: 
WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 17 
(2001) (“In this period of rapid and dramatic change in women’s workforce roles, older 
notions of protection for women workers began to crumble and occupational segregation by 
sex became the target of attack.”); see also McDermott, supra note 83 (“[A]fter their selfless 
efforts during World War II, men could no longer claim superiority over women. Women had 
enjoyed and even thrived on a taste of financial and personal freedom—and many wanted more. 
Though progress was slow over the next two decades, serving their country in the military and at 
home empowered women to fight for the right to work in nontraditional jobs for equal pay and 
for equal rights in the workplace and beyond.”). Kessler-Harris also argues that women’s 
experience in World War II had long-lasting impacts on notions of gender within the 
women’s rights movement, as “a new consensus emerge[d] among women leaders” that 
women should “drop claims to gender difference.” KESSLER-HARRIS, supra, at 17. 
91 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973) (holding that the policy 
requiring female service members to prove the dependency of their spouses was 
unconstitutional, thus entitling female service members to the same dependent benefits as 
male service members for their spouses and children). 
92 See, e.g., Act of May 24, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-290, 88 Stat. 173 (codified as amended at 
10 U.S.C. § 505) (reducing the minimum age of consent for women to enlist to be consistent with 
the age of consent for men); Act of Oct. 7, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-106, § 803(a-c), 89 Stat. 537 
(current version at 10 U.S.C. § 7442) (allowing women to attend the military service academies). 
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directives from the Department of Defense and the services.93 In the 1990s, 
Congress banned the use of gender quotas for any military occupation, although 
women’s exclusion from most combat occupations continued.94 
 In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin lifted the combat exclusion 
policy on nearly all aviation roles, which allowed women to serve as attack 
aviation pilots for the first time.95 However, the prohibition of women in 
ground combat roles remained in place. It was not until 2013 that Secretary 
of Defense Leon Panetta announced plans to rescind the combat exclusion 
policy; he directed all branches of the Armed Forces to conduct assessments 
on how to integrate women into all career fields by 2015.96 In 2015, Secretary 
of Defense Ash Carter formally announced that all military occupations 
would be opened to women.97 
 In an influential essay published in 1978, Harvard sociologist Maury 
Feld predicted that the inclusion of significant numbers of women in the 
military would inevitably increase women’s social, political, and economic 
equality in American society.98 Ending the masculine monopoly on state-
sponsored violence, he argued, would have a radical impact on conventional 
perceptions of women within the social system, disrupting the “cultural 
complex” which makes women appear to be “a natural object of men’s own 
aggressive impulses.”99 The military’s ongoing problems with sexual 
harassment and sexual violence suggest that Feld underestimated the 
resilience of sexism. Women’s integration has not necessarily undermined 
 
93 For example, in 1972, the DOD opened the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) to 
women, and in 1975, it repealed a policy permitting involuntary separation of pregnant 
women from the military. KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 26. 
94 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, 
§543(2), 107 Stat. 1547, 1660–61 (1993) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 113 note). 
95 See Swick & Moore, supra note 3; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 531, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). 
96 See Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Leon Panetta and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Martin Dempsey to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts on Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground 
Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (Jan. 24, 2013), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/ 
Documents/WISRJointMemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCR8-8P5Z] (recognizing the contributions 
of the women currently serving in the military and affirming that the goal of the Department 
is to remove all gender based, non-performance related barriers to career advancement for 
women in service).  
97 See Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Ash Carter to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts on 
Implementation Guidance for the Full Integration of Women in the Armed Forces (Dec. 3, 
2015) [hereinafter DOD 2015 Order to Fully Integrate Women], https://dod.defense.gov/ 
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/OSD014303-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7WP-Q5UJ] (formally 
announcing that there are no exceptions to the 1994 recission of the Combat Exclusion Rule).  
98 See M.D. Feld, Arms and the Woman: Some General Considerations, 4 ARMED FORCES & 
SOC’Y 557, 558 (1978). 
99 Id. 
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the gendered structure of the military or American society.100 Yet, taken as a 
whole, the history recounted here demonstrates that women’s integration has 
played a role in challenging societal systems of sex discrimination. While we 
do not contend that women’s participation in the American military pushed 
American society inexorably toward women’s equality, it has contributed to 
the reformulation of gender roles.  
 
C. Voting Rights 
 
 Young adults ages eighteen to twenty-one enjoy the right to vote as a 
direct consequence of military service.101 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment to 
the Constitution was enacted in 1971 during the Vietnam War, lowering the 
national minimum voting age from twenty-one to eighteen.102 This change 
was a response to the perceived unfairness of sending young draftees to 
combat without a say in the political process, as reflected in the “old enough 
to fight, old enough to vote” slogan touted by proponents of lowering the 
voting age.103 After Congress passed the Amendment, thirty-eight states 
 
100 See discussion infra Section II.A; cf. also Noya Rimalt, Women in the Sphere of 
Masculinity: The Double-Edged Sword of Women’s Integration in the Military, 14 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 1097, 1113–17 (2007) (examining the resilience of sexist ideology and 
practices in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) despite decades of women’s integration, 
including a gendered division of labor and sexual harassment in the IDF).  
101 See generally Hilary Parkinson, Records of Rights Vote: “Old Enough to Fight, Old 
Enough to Vote”, NAT’L ARCHIVES: PIECES OF HISTORY (Nov. 13, 2013) https://prologue. 
blogs.archives.gov/2013/11/13/records-of-rights-vote-old-enough-to-fight-old-enough-to-
vote/ [https://perma.cc/N8VT-LYYL]. 
102 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
103 The “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” slogan actually first emerged during World 
War II, when President Roosevelt lowered the minimum age of draftees to eighteen, causing 
debate over sending young men off to war without the right to vote. Parkinson, supra note 
101. In his 1954 State of the Union Address, President Eisenhower said: “For years our 
citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 have, in time of peril, been summoned to fight for 
America. They should participate in the political process that produces this fateful 
summons.” Annual Message to Congress on the States of the Union, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 6, 
22 (Jan. 7, 1954). Debate intensified during Vietnam due to growing public dissatisfaction 
over the apparent inequities of the draft, particularly the use of educational deferments that 
resulted in the disproportionate drafting of young, low-income men. See David Card & 
Thomas Lemieux, Going to College to Avoid the Draft: The Unintended Legacy of the 
Vietnam War, 91 AMER. ECON. REV. 97, 97–98 (2001) (detailing how deferments for college 
influenced many young single men to remain in school). In 1970, Congress amended the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to allow eighteen-year-olds to vote in state and national elections. 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 52 U.S.C.). Although President Nixon signed 
the amendments into law, he did so stating that he believed Congress did not have the 
authority to change the age requirement for state elections. Statement on Signing the Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 512, 512–13 (June 22, 1970). The 
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ratified it in only 100 days, the fastest time for any constitutional 
amendment.104  
 
D. LGBTQ Rights 
 
Scholars have detailed the historical exclusion of gay men and lesbians 
from the United States military and the links between changing understandings 
of sexuality in the military and in American society.105 A detailed account of 
this history is beyond the scope of this Article. However, we briefly summarize 
the latest chapter in this history to highlight the military’s potentially positive 
role in fostering equality in American society, however complex and 
ambiguous the narrative of progress. 
 In 2010 President Obama signed the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal 
Act into law, ending the Department of Defense policy that had banned 
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals from serving in the military.106 
This policy change was instituted five years before the Supreme Court held 
that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry.107 Justice 
 
Supreme Court considered the issue in Oregon v. Mitchell and held that Congress only had 
authority to lower the voting age in federal elections, but not state elections, producing a 
result where voters under the age of twenty-one would be able to vote for the President and 
congressional representation, but not state or local officials. 400 U.S. 112, 150 (1970). This 
impractical situation resulted in Congress unanimously passing the 26th Amendment in 
1971, with the requisite thirty-eight states ratifying the amendment in only 100 days. 
Parkinson, supra note 101. 
104 See Proclamation 8691, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,215 (July 8, 2011) (detailing the Presidential 
proclamation by President Obama acknowledging the 40th anniversary of the 26th Amendment). 
105 See CANADAY, supra note 72, at 55–90. 
106 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (codified 
at 10 U.S.C. § 654). There were policies prohibiting gay individuals from serving in the 
Armed Forces since WWII, but the branches did not adopt a unified approach. See NAT’L 
DEF. RSCH. INST., RAND CORP., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL 
POLICY: AN UPDATE OF RAND’S 1993 STUDY 41 (2010) (describing inconsistencies among 
the approaches taken by each service). This led to a 1982 Department of Defense Directive 
providing a unified rationale for prohibiting gay and lesbian individuals from serving, 
allegedly because of “military effectiveness.” See id. at 41 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 
1332.14 (1982); DIR. 1332.30 (1986)). In 1993, President Clinton was poised to eliminate 
the ban entirely via executive order but faced strong opposition from the military and 
Congress, the latter threatening to add the ban to the Family and Medical Leave Act. See id. 
at 42 (citing a statement by then Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole). A compromise position 
was reached that came to be known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” whereby gay Americans 
could serve so long as they remained closeted; the military would remove questions about 
sexual orientation on induction forms and service members would be required to keep 
information about a same-sex orientation private. See id. at 43; see also DAVID F. BURRELLI, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., NO. 7-5700, “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”: MILITARY POLICY AND THE 
LAW ON SAME-SEX BEHAVIOR 1–4 (Dec. 16, 2010) (detailing the history of the Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell policy). 
107 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015).  
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Kennedy, writing for a five-member majority of the Court, explained that the 
repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell “led to an enhanced understanding” of the 
constitutional definition of marriage.108 
Presidential administrations often use the military as a canvas on 
which to project policies they think should represent American values. 
This understanding of the military’s powerful example no doubt motivated 
the Obama administration to allow open military service by gay, 
lesbian,109 and transgender110 individuals during his administration; 
President Trump’s reversal (on transgender service);111 and President 
 
108 Id. at 676. 
109 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (codified 
at 10 U.S.C. § 654); see also DTM 16-005, supra note 5 (describing “strength through 
diversity” as a motivation for allowing transgender people to serve in the military). 
110 In June 2016, during the Obama administration, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter 
announced a new policy that would allow transgender service members to openly serve in 
the military. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., TRANSGENDER SERVICE IN THE U.S. MILITARY, AN 
IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK 2 (2016). 
111 In July 2017, President Trump announced on Twitter that the military would not allow 
transgender individuals to serve in any capacity. Factbox: Trump on Twitter (July 26) - U.S. 
Military, Transgender Individuals, REUTERS (July 26, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-trump-tweet-factbox/factbox-trump-on-twitter-u-s-military-transgender-indi 
viduals-idUSKBN1AB1X9 [https://perma.cc/7A92-ZQMJ] (providing transcripts of 
Trump’s tweets announcing the transgender service ban). President Trump followed through 
with his tweets by issuing a presidential memorandum in August 2017 that blocked 
transgender persons from serving and allowed for their discharge. See Memorandum on 
Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 587 (Aug. 25, 
2017) (highlighting the politically divisive issue of the “use of the Departments’ resources 
to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures,” and prohibiting transgender individuals from 
serving in the military). Legal challenges in federal district court resulted in preliminary 
injunctions temporarily halting the Trump policy. See Karnoski v. Trump, Case No. C17-
1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. 
Supp. 3d 747, 769 (D. Md. 2017); Stockman v. Trump, Case No. EDCV 17-1799 JGB, 2017 
WL9732572, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 217 
(D.D.C. 2017). However, after Trump’s 2017 Memorandum was enjoined, President Trump 
revoked the 2017 Memorandum and replaced it with a new memorandum banning most 
transgender persons from service but adding a grandfathering provision and new, narrower 
exceptions. See Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. to President Trump, subject: Military 
Service by Transgender Individuals (Feb. 22, 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/ 
Mar/23/2001894037/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-SERVICE-BY-TRANSGENDER-INDIVIDUALS. 
PDF [https://perma.cc/9YCM-5ZZ8] (adding exceptions); Memorandum on Military Service 
by Transgender Individuals, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Mar. 23, 2018) (revoking and 
replacing the 2017 Memorandum). The Trump Administration then moved to dissolve the 
preliminary injunctions, claiming there had been a significant change to the policy. See 
Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 
2018); Stone v. Trump, No. GLR-17-2459, 2019 WL 5697228, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2019); 
Stockman v. Trump, 331 F. Supp. 3d 990, 993 (C.D. Cal. 2018); Doe 2 v. Trump, 315 F. 
Supp. 3d 474, 483 (D.D.C. 2018). Several district courts decided it was really the same policy 
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Biden’s decision to reinstate the Obama policy in full immediately upon 
taking office.112 
 In sum, as we have demonstrated, societies shape their military 
institutions in their own image, but military institutions also help shape 
society113—for better or worse.114 In the age of the #MeToo movement and 
increased focus on sexual assault and harassment, it is therefore worthwhile 
to consider how a massive organization like the Department of Defense has 
addressed these problems. A critical examination of the military’s record on 
sexual misconduct is necessary for the health of the military and our country 
more broadly. 
 
II. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN THE MILITARY 
 
A. Two Decades of Data on Sexual Assault and Harassment in the Military 
 
 Perhaps it should not be surprising, in light of the military’s 
complicated relationship with integration and equality, that it continues to 
struggle with sexual assault and harassment. As we discuss in this Part, the 
 
and found the preliminary injunctions were still warranted, but the U.S. Supreme Court 
stayed the injunctions by a 5–4 vote. Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950, 950 (2019). 
Additionally, the D.C. and Ninth Circuits both reversed decisions that held the preliminary 
injunctions in place, with the D.C. Circuit vacating the preliminary injunction and the Ninth 
Circuit remanding for further consideration. See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 22 
(D.C. Cir. 2019); Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1207 (9th Cir. 2019). The transgender 
ban went into effect in April 2019 while the legal challenges continued into discovery. See 
GLAD Legal Advocs. & Defs. & Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rts., Timeline, NO TRANS MILITARY 
BAN, https://notransmilitaryban.org/timeline/ [https://perma.cc/5C6U-2RPE] (last visited 
June 20, 2020). 
112 President Biden reversed Trump’s policy just five days after taking office with the 
Executive Order on Enabling All Qualified Americans to Serve Their Country in Uniform. 
See Exec. Order No. 14,004, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,471 (Jan. 25, 2021) (revoking President Trump’s 
2018 Memorandum and directing the Department of Defense “to ensure that all transgender 
individuals who wish to serve in the United States military and can meet the appropriate 
standards shall be able to do so openly and free from discrimination”). The Department of 
Defense issued policy updates permitting openly transgender individuals to serve in the 
military on March 31, 2021. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Press Release, DOD Announces Policy 
Updates for Transgender Military Service, DOD.GOV (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.defense. 
gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2557220/dod-announces-policy-updates-for-trans 
gender-military-service/ [https://perma.cc/WJJ8-W44U]. 
113 See generally MAURY D. FELD, THE STRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE: ARMED FORCES AS 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1977). 
114 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944). In 1942, President 
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, “giving the army the power, without warrants or 
indictments or hearings, to arrest every Japanese-American on the West Coast—110,000 
men, women, and children—to take them from their homes, transport them to camps far into 
the interior, and keep them there under prison conditions.” HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 416 (2005).  
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Department of Defense has in recent decades made considerable investments 
in policies and actions that aim to prevent and respond to sexual misconduct. 
These efforts have been spurred by heightened awareness about sexual 
harassment in the United States since the 1990s115 and several high-profile 
sexual misconduct scandals that brought public attention to the military’s 
deeply sexist culture. However, despite more than two decades of reform 
efforts by the military to address the problems of sexual assault and 
harassment, little has changed.  
 Concerted efforts to address sexual misconduct in the military began 
in the early 1990s with the “Tailhook” and “Aberdeen” sexual misconduct 
scandals.116 In the Tailhook scandal, United States Navy and Marine Corps 
aviation officers sexually assaulted eighty-three women and seven men 
during a 1991 annual convention of the Tailhook Association,117 a fraternal 
organization of naval aviators.118 In the fallout from the scandal, the Secretary 
 
115 One might argue that ground zero for this emerging awareness in the United States was 
Professor Anita Hill’s allegation that Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas had sexually 
harassed her from 1981 to 1983 when he was her supervisor at the EEOC, and her riveting 
testimony in his confirmation hearings before the United States Senate in October 1991. See 
4 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 41–48 (1991) 
(statement of Anita Hill, Professor, University of Oklahoma); ANITA HILL, SPEAKING TRUTH 
TO POWER (1997); Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools: Findings 
and Open Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 662 & nn.1–2 (2006) (discussing the Clarence 
Thomas-Anita Hill hearings). Although Thomas adamantly denied the allegations and the 
Senate confirmed him, a nationwide debate ensued about sexual harassment, how to define 
it, prevent it, and limit employer liability. Less than one year after Justice Thomas’s 
confirmation hearings, reports of sexual harassment to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission rose by more than 50%. Jane Gross, Suffering in Silence No More: Fighting 
Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/13/us/ 
suffering-in-silence-no-more-fighting-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/8SZY-TR7T]. 
116 See Michael Winerip, Revisiting the Military’s Tailhook Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/booming/revisiting-the-militarys-tailhook-scandal-
video.html [https://perma.cc/9TPR-JY9B]; see also Diane H. Mazur, The Beginning of the 
End for Women in the Military, 48 FLA. L. REV. 461, 464 (1996) (discussing the Aberdeen 
sexual misconduct scandal). 
117 See Winerip, supra note 116. 
118 Specifically, the Tailhook Association is a U.S.-based, nonprofit fraternal organization of 
naval aviators. See TAILHOOK, https://www.tailhook.net/ [https://perma.cc/YRX2-3D6W] 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2020). The word “tailhook” refers to a device underneath the rear of 
certain military aircraft that catches an arresting wire suspended across an aircraft carrier’s 
flight deck to rapidly decelerate the landing plane. See Tom Harris, How Aircraft Carriers 
Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM (Aug. 29, 2002), https://science.howstuffworks.com/aircraft-
carrier4. htm [https://perma.cc/7XQW-KPUH]. 
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of the Navy resigned after Congress learned that he had visited a hotel room  
near the hall where the assaults took place.119 
 The Aberdeen scandal involved sexual misconduct at Aberdeen Proving 
Ground in 1996.120 Aberdeen was home to the Army Ordnance Corps Advanced 
Individual Training (AIT) school, an entry training program for new recruits.121 
The Army began investigating allegations of assault in 1996, with the 
investigation ultimately resulting in fifty formal complaints of sexual harassment 
and abuse.122 Eleven drill sergeants and one officer were implicated for abusing 
positions of power by forcing trainees to have sex with them. One sergeant had 
raped nineteen trainees, and an officer had slept with a trainee who had come to 
him for advice about how to deal with sexual harassment from a drill 
instructor.123 Ultimately, four officers were sentenced to prison while eight 
others were discharged or received nonjudicial punishments; Aberdeen’s 
commanding general and three other officers received reprimand letters.124 As a 
result of the incident, the DOD directed all branches of the military to assess their 
training policies and formed a Federal Advisory Committee on Gender 
Integration Training, which issued recommendations in 1997.125  
 The Department of Defense first began collecting data on sexual 
assault and harassment around this time via the Workplace and Gender 
 
119 See Eric Schmitt, Navy Chief Quits Amid Questions Over Role in Sex-Assault Inquiry, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/27/us/navy-chief-quits-
amid-questions-over-role-in-sex-assault-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/8ZMZ-46XH]. 
120 See Neil A. Lewis, Ex-Sergeant Pleads Guilty to Having Sex with Trainees, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 8, 1997) https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/08/us/ex-sergeant-pleads-guilty-to-hav ing-
sex-with-trainees.html [https://perma.cc/8NLS-6HCV]. 
121 History, U.S. ARMY ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, https://home.army.mil/apg/index.php/ 
about/history [https://perma.cc/V6W3-52QY] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020). 
122 Id. 
123 Id.; see also United States v. Simpson, 55 M.J. 674, 692, 698–707, 710 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 
2001) (reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence and affirming Army drill sergeant Delman 
Simpson’s conviction of eighteen rape charges, noting that “the record clearly reflects that 
the appellant was a sexual predator”). 
124 See Steve Vogel, Scandal-Scarred Army Busts Drill Sergeant in Sex-Crime Clampdown, 
L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2000, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-
may-14-mn-29893-story.html [https://perma.cc/E5NW-UD2M]. 
125 See NANCY L. KASSELBAUM & WILLIAM S. COHEN, FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON GENDER-
INTEGRATED TRAINING & RELATED ISSUES, DOD-5188, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON GENDER-INTEGRATED TRAINING AND RELATED ISSUES TO THE SECRETARY 
OF DEFENSE 3–4 (1997), https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/LPS79701 [https://perma.cc/NNG9-
ADA9] (presenting a set of recommendations to improve gender integrated training, 
including better screening of recruits, increasing the number of female recruiters and trainers, 
establishing separate barracks for men and women, enforcing consistent standards for male and 
female recruits, improving instruction on how men and women should relate to one another 
professionally, and improving “values” training). 
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Relations Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA).126 The first survey was 
administered in 1988, and a subsequent survey was conducted in 1995 
following the Tailhook scandal. Since 2002, Congress has mandated surveys 
on racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination,127 as well as an annual report to 
Congress on the “status of female members of the armed forces” addressing 
promotion and retention rates, selection for elite service schools, assignment 
to male-dominated occupational fields, and incidence of sexual harassment 
complaints made during that fiscal year.128 These surveys and reports have 
generated significant data on gender discrimination and the prevalence of 
sexual assault and harassment. 
 Overall, the picture that emerges from this data is a general lack of 
progress with regard to sexual assault and harassment in the military. That is, 
despite two decades of data collection and concerted efforts to address the 
problems of sexual assault and harassment in the military, these efforts have 
not been successful. Data from the six WGRA surveys between 2002 and 
2018 show that 22% to 34% of women and 3% to 6% of men experienced 
sexual harassment.129 In the same period, the prevalence rate of sexual assault 
 
126 See Valerie A. Stander & Cynthia J. Thomsen, Sexual Harassment and Assault in the U.S. 
Military: A Review of Policy and Research Trends, 1 MIL. MED. 20, 21 (2016) (explaining 
the history of the WGRA survey and the instruments it uses). 
127 Section 561 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 requires the Secretary of 
Defense to carry out one of four quadrennial surveys (each in a separate year) “to identify 
and assess racial and ethnic issues and discrimination, and to identify and assess gender 
issues and discrimination, among members of the armed forces.” See Pub. L. No. 107-314, 
116 Stat. 2458, 2553 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 481). 
128 Id. 
129 See RACHEL N. LIPARI & ANITA R. LANCASTER, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., ARMED FORCES 2002 SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 16 fig. 3.3 (2003) [hereinafter 
2002 WGRA SURVEY], https://archive.defense.gov/news/Feb2004/d20040227shs1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/66YH-YL9Q] (reporting that 24% of active duty females and 3% of active 
duty males reported experiencing sexual harassment in 2002); RACHEL N. LIPARI, PAUL J. 
COOK, LINDSAY M. ROCK & KENNETH MATOS, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., 2006 GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS 4 (2008), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Personnel_Related/2
006-WGRA-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB6T-B4X7] (reporting that 34% of women and 6% of 
men indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2006); LINDSAY M. ROCK, RACHEL N. LIPARI, 
PAUL J. COOK & ANDREW D. HALE, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 2010 
WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS: OVERVIEW REPORT 
ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT iv (2011) [hereinafter 2010 WGRA SURVEY], https://apps.dtic.mil/ 
sti/pdfs/ADA541045.pdf [https://perma.cc/P39X-UQTR] (reporting that 21% of women and 3% 
of men indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2010); DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., 2012 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY 
MEMBERS: SURVEY NOTE AND BRIEFING 4 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 WGRA SURVEY], 
https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/defense-research [https://perma.cc/RX2U-
UW4B] (choose “2012 WGRA Survey Note” from “Active Duty”) (reporting that 23% of women 
and 4% of men indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2012); LISA DAVIS, AMANDA 
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ranged from 4% to 7% for women and 1% to 2% for men.130 And the problem 
is actually getting worse.  
 According to the Department of Defense 2018 Annual Report on 
Sexual Assault in the Military, 20,500 service members reported that they had 
experienced “unwanted sexual contact” during the 2018 fiscal year,131 an 
increase of roughly 38% over the 2016 survey.132 Of the 20,500 service 
members reporting that they experienced unwanted sexual contact, 13,000 or 
63% were women,133 even though women make up only 16% of active duty 
service members.134 Young women between the ages of 17 and 24 and junior 
enlisted women were at greatest risk of being assaulted, with nearly 10% of 
junior enlisted women indicating that they experienced a sexual assault.135  
In fiscal year 2018, one in four female service members reported 
experiencing sexual harassment.136 This figure is consistent with prior studies 
of sexual harassment in the military going back almost two decades. For 
example, in 2014, at Congress’s request, the RAND National Defense 
Research Institute conducted an independent assessment of sexual harassment. 
Roughly 560,0000 active duty and reserve service members were surveyed.137 
 
GRIFKA, KRISTIN WILLIAMS & MARGARET COFFEY, OFF. OF PEOPLE ANALYTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., 2016 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS: 
OVERVIEW REPORT xvi (2017) [hereinafter 2016 WGRA SURVEY], https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/ 
dwp/app/dod-data-reports/defense-research [https://perma.cc/RX2U-UW4B] (choose “2016 
WGRA Overview Report” from “Active Duty”) (reporting that 21.4% of women and 5.7% of men 
indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2016); RACHEL A. BRESLIN, LISA DAVIS, KIMBERLY 
HYLTON, ARIEL HILL, WILLIAM KLAUBERG, MARK PETUSKY & ASHLEA KLAHR, OFF. OF PEOPLE 
ANALYTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 2018 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE 
DUTY MEMBERS: OVERVIEW REPORT ix (2019) [hereinafter 2018 WGRA SURVEY], 
https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/defense-research [https://perma.cc/RX2U-
UW4B] (choose “2018 WGRA Overview Report” from “Active Duty”) (reporting that 21.4% 
of women and 5.7% of men indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2018) (reporting that 
24.2% of active duty women and 6.3% of active duty men indicated experiencing sexual 
harassment in 2018). 
130 See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 (reporting 
sexual assault and prevalence rates from 2006 to 2018); see also Stander & Thomsen, supra note 
126, at 21 (discussing sexual assault and prevalence rates from 2002 to 2012). 
131 DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
132 Id. at 3, 12; see also Dave Philipps, ‘This is Unacceptable.’ Military Reports a Surge of Sexual 
Assaults in the Ranks, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/us/ 
military-sexual-assault.html [https://perma.cc/63BR-3X3Y].  
133 DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
134 Barroso, supra note 11. 
135 See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 
(“An estimated 9.1 percent of junior enlisted women (E1-E4) indicated experiencing 
sexual assault . . . .”). 
136 Id. at 9. 
137 RAND CORP., SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. MILITARY: 
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 2014 RAND MILITARY WORKPLACE STUDY 1 (2015), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9841.html [https://perma.cc/2EZB-PQ43]. 
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The results showed that 22% of women and 7% of men experienced sexual 
harassment.138 Of those who experienced harassment, just 33% of men and 
46% of women reported it.139 The RAND study also found that sexual 
harassment and gender discrimination are highly correlated with sexual 
assault.140 Prior to the 2014 RAND survey, the 2002 WGRA survey found 
that 24% of women in the military and 3% of men had been sexually 
harassed.141 In other words, there has been little progress in the overall rates 
of sexual harassment in the military in nearly twenty years. Based on these 
figures, comparative studies suggest that sexual harassment is substantially 
worse in the military than in civilian workplaces.142 
The 2016 WGRA included questions addressing sexual orientation 
and transgender identity for the first time. Overall, 22.8% of service members 
identifying as LGBT experienced sexual harassment and 4.5% sexual assault, 
compared with 6.2% and .8% for those who do not identify as LGBT, 
respectively.143 
Military service members who experience sexual assault and 
harassment often never see a remedy. Military surveys indicate that there is 
insufficient accountability.144 Sexual assault is underreported, meaning that 
 
138 Id. at 3. 
139 RAND CORP., 2 SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. MILITARY: 
ESTIMATES FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SERVICE MEMBERS FROM THE 2014 RAND MILITARY 
WORKPLACE STUDY 50 (Andrew R. Morral, Kristie L. Gore & Terry L. Schell eds., 2015), https:// 
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR870z2-1.html [https://perma.cc/48BW-KQNA].  
140 Id. at xxii, 92–93; see also TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL ASSAULT ACCOUNTABILITY & 
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT ACCOUNTABILITY AND INVEST-
IGATION TASK FORCE REPORT 18 (2019) [hereinafter SAAITF REPORT], https://media. 
defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127159/-1/-1/1/SAAITF_REPORT.PDF [https://perma.cc/ 
9FZB-QT9C] (“Based on surveys conducted by the Department, there is a strong positive 
correlation between the occurrence of sexual harassment within military units and the 
occurrence of sexual assault.”). 
141 2002 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at 18. 
142 See Remus Ilies, Nancy Hauserman, Susan Schwochau & John Stibal, Reported Incidence 
Rates of Work-Related Sexual Harassment in the United States: Using Meta-Analysis to 
Explain Reported Rate Disparities, 56 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 607, 624 (2003) (finding, based 
on a meta-analysis, that the prevalence of sexual harassment is significantly higher in the 
military than in three different civilian contexts (academic, private sector, and government)). 
143 See 2016 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at xxii. 
144 The most recent evidence of this is the military’s own investigative report of sexual 
harassment and ultimate murder of Vanessa Guillén, a 20-year-old U.S. Army soldier, inside a 
Fort Hood, Texas, armory by another enlisted soldier in April 2020. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, 
REPORT OF THE FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE 17, 18, 21, 27 (2020), https:// 
www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/forthoodreview/2020-12-03_FHIRC_report_redacted.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U96L-FMGH] (detailing the utter failure of the Army’s sexual assault and 
harassment response and prevention program at Fort Hood, including “hollow” and 
“perfunctory” responses to reports of sexual assault and harassment, higher than average rates 
of violent sex crimes, NCO’s (responsible for reporting) themselves taking advantage of 
subordinate victims, and “universal” fear of retaliation for reporting sexual misconduct). 
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only a fraction of victims report sexual assault to military authorities. In 2018, 
only one in three service members who experienced a sexual assault reported 
it to a military authority.145 In FY 2018, just 7% (223 out of 3,005) of sexual 
assault cases in the Defense Department’s jurisdiction investigated with a 
reportable outcome led to a sex offense conviction.146 
Military surveys indicate that most respondents—67%—who 
experienced unwanted sexual contact and reported it to a military authority 
faced retaliation for reporting.147 A 2015 investigation by Human Rights 
Watch similarly found a widespread culture of retaliation against service 
members who report sexual assault in the military. They suffered a host of 
negative consequences, including adverse changes in work assignments, 
negative performance evaluations, punishment for minor infractions, 
bullying, and threats.148 Negative consequences for reporting sexual 
harassment are similarly routine. Actions taken in response to those who 
report sexual harassment and gender discrimination are “frequently negative; 
for example: being encouraged to drop the issue, discouraged from filing a 
report, or being treated worse, avoided, or blamed by coworkers.”149 
 
145 See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 15 
(stating that 30% of the estimated 20,500 total service members who experienced a sexual 
assault in fiscal year 2018 made a report).  
146 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL 
YEAR 2019, APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL DATA ON SEXUAL ASSAULT 32–42 (2020) 
[hereinafter DOD FY 2019 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, APP. B], https://www.sapr.mil/ 
sites/default/files/3_Appendix_B_Statistical_Data_on_Sexual_Assault.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
A2R9-RQWA]. For a study examining the causes of the low conviction rate for sex crimes 
in the military, see Carolyn M. Warner & Mia A. Armstrong, The Role of Military Law and 
Systemic Issues in the Military’s Handling of Sexual Assault Cases, 54 L. & SOC’Y REV. 265 
(2020) (finding, on the basis of an analysis of 585 sex-assault report summaries, that the 
military’s low conviction rate for sexual assault is attributable to a number of systemic 
factors, including “rape culture,” which leads to skepticism about victims’ claims; lack of 
jurisdiction; the high evidentiary standards required for court-martial; the availability of 
alternative non-criminal dispositions in the military justice system; typical prosecutorial 
concerns about quality of evidence; and military-specific concerns prioritizing mission 
readiness and a defendant’s otherwise “good military character” over prosecution). 
147 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL YEAR 
2018, APPENDIX C: METRICS AND NON-METRICS ON SEXUAL ASSAULT 18 (2019), 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/sapro/Reports/04%20-%20FY%2018%20Appendix%20C%20 
Metrics%20and%20Non-Metrics%20on%20Sexual%20Assault.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S7V-
R6NR] (reporting that 67% of those who reported a sexual assault said they perceived at 
least one negative outcome connected with reporting, including professional reprisal, 
ostracism, and maltreatment.).  
148 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, EMBATTLED: RETALIATION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT 
SURVIVORS IN THE US MILITARY (May 18, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/18/ 
embattled/retaliation-against-sexual-assault-survivors-us-military [https://perma.cc/EG4N-CLP3]. 
149 See 2018 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at x–xi. 
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Sexual misconduct is also an issue at the three military Service 
Academies (West Point, Air Force Academy, Naval Academy). The Service 
Academies are military colleges that produce officers and future leaders for 
each branch of the Armed Forces.150 The Department of Defense Annual 
Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Service Academies, 
Academic Program Year 2017–2018 found a 50% increase in sexual assaults 
over the 2015–2016 school year, with 747 students reporting unwanted 
sexual contact during the year.151 Fifty percent of women and 16% of men 
experienced sexual harassment.152 These findings are especially troubling 
because the Academies are considered prestigious institutions, cultivating the 
military’s future leaders. Women are relatively well represented at the 
Academies; about a third of all students are female.153 If the institutions 
creating the future leaders of our Armed Forces are still struggling with sexual 
assault and harassment, it is a discouraging sign for the military writ large. 
  
B. The DOD’s Response 
 
Responding to the worsening statistics on sexual misconduct from the 
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, then-Acting Secretary 
of Defense Patrick Shanahan issued a memorandum to the top leadership of 
the Armed Forces titled “Actions to Address and Prevent Sexual Assault in 
the Military.”154 His message was urgent: 
We must address how we are structured and how we resource 
efforts to combat this scourge. We must improve our culture 
to treat each other with dignity and respect and hold ourselves, 
and each other, more accountable. The essential elements that 
give rise to dignity and respect must be part of our daily 
repertoire of interactions. This is a call to action.155 
 
150 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AT THE 
MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES: ACADEMIC PROGRAM YEAR 2017–2018, at 27 (2019) 
[hereinafter DOD 2018 SERVICE ACADEMY REPORT], https://evawintl.org/wp-con 
tent/uploads/APY17-18_MSA_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ62-VWP4]. 
151 Id. at 6; Patricia Kime, Sexual Assaults Rise Nearly 50 Percent at Service Academies, 
MILITARY.COM (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/01/31/sexual-
assaults-rise-nearly-50-percent-service-academies.html [https://perma.cc/U2HV-ZBG7]. 
152 DOD 2018 SERVICE ACADEMY REPORT, supra note 150, at 4, 6. 
153 Id. at 6.  
154 Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. to Sec’ys of Mil. Dep’ts, et al., subject: Actions to 




155 Id. at 1. 
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The memorandum called for sweeping changes to how the military handles 
sexual assaults and included six directives.156 
The first and arguably most significant directive was to adopt the 
DOD Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation Task Force’s 
(SAAITF) recommendation that the Joint Service Committee on Military 
Justice (JSC)157 should draft a proposal for a specific offense of sexual 
harassment to be added to the Manual for Courts-Martial.158 This new article 
would make sexual harassment a criminal offense under military law, with 
its own distinct elements.159 The second directive was to develop “climate 
assessment tools” designed to allow leaders to identify and address problems 
in their units.160 The third directive was to launch a “Serial Offender 
(CATCH) Program,” a program designed to identify repeat offenders.161 The 
fourth directive was to develop measures to improve assessment of military 
recruit character; this was, essentially, a directive to screen out individuals 
with a history or propensity for sexual misconduct in the military’s recruiting 
process.162 The fifth directive called for the creation of a working group on 
training junior officers to address sexual harassment and sexual assault.163 
Finally, Shanahan directed the military to implement the 2019–2023 DOD 
Sexual Assault Prevention Plan of Action (PPOA).164 The PPOA is a strategic 
plan to “guide the Department’s prevention efforts at each echelon of the 
military environment.”165 Among other features, the Plan includes measures 
 
156 Id. at 1–3; see also Tom Vanden Brook, Shanahan Calls for Reforms as Military Sexual 
Assaults Rise by 38%; Highest for Young Women, USA TODAY (May 2, 2019, 12:15 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/05/02/military-sexual-assaults-climb-2016-
2018-pentagon-army-navy-marines-alcohol/3625405002/ [https://perma.cc/F8Z9-5Z9T].  
157 The JSC is charged with keeping the Manual for Courts-Martial and Uniform Code of 
Military Justice current. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 5500.17, ROLE AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE 1 (Feb. 21, 
2018) (defining the roles, responsibilities, and procedures of the JSC in reviewing and 
proposing changes to the MCM); see also JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., https://jsc. 
defense.gov [https://perma.cc/8H73-HSMM] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020) (describing the role 
and jurisdiction of the JSC). 
158 See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 1; see also SAAITF REPORT, supra note 
140, at 19. 
159 Id.; see also infra Section II.B.2.b. 
160 See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 2.  
161 Id.; see also infra Section II.B.1. 
162 See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 2. 
163 Id. at 2–3. 
164 Id. at 3.  
165 United States Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: 
Prevention, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.sapr.mil/prevention [https://perma.cc/5ZLS-
65V4] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020). 
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to survey the magnitude of sexual misconduct in the military, identify risk 
factors, implement prevention activities, and continue evaluation.166  
Although Shanahan’s memo was no doubt part of a genuine effort to 
address sexual assault and harassment, most of the recommendations are not 
departures from what the military already does on a consistent basis. The 
Department of Defense already collects data on sexual misconduct and has a 
firm understanding of the scope of the problem.167 Reassessment of sexual 
assault and harassment prevention trainings is nothing new. However, two of 
the suggested measures represent substantive departures from past military 
policy and deserve attention. These are implementing the CATCH repeat 
offender program and making sexual harassment a punitive offense under the 
UCMJ.  
 
1. The CATCH program 
 
The Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) Program, recently 
implemented in 2019, is a DOD-wide program designed to track individuals 
who are reported as “perpetrators” in “restricted” (i.e., anonymous, informal) 
reports of sexual misconduct. The CATCH program works a bit like a sex-
offender registry. An individual submits the name or other identifying 
information of an alleged perpetrator to an online repository, which military 
criminal investigators use to check against other restricted reports to see if 
there is a match.168 If there is a match, CATCH program representatives will 
contact the victim and let them know.169 With this knowledge, the victim has 
one of two options. They can take formal action against the alleged 
perpetrator by filing an “unrestricted” report disclosing the victim’s and 
alleged perpetrator’s identities and involving the respective chains of 
command. In the alternative, they can choose to do nothing, in which case 
they will be contacted again if the alleged perpetrator’s name comes up in 
another report within ten years.170 If that notification is subsequently made, a 
 
166 OFF. OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR PERSONNEL & READINESS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
PREVENTION PLAN OF ACTION 2019–2023, at 5–7 (2019), https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/ 
files/PPoA%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EJ7-TZHG].  
167 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
168 C. Todd Lopez, New DOD Program Leaves Sexual Predators Nowhere to Hide, 
DEFENSE.GOV (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1926005/ 
new-dod-program-leaves-sexual-predators-nowhere-to-hide/ [https://perma.cc/3AYK-XY7Y].  
169 Id.  
170 Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT 
PREVENTION & RESPONSE [hereinafter DOD CATCH Program], https://www.sapr.mil/catch 
[https://perma.cc/FJT6-VFCU] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020). For a victim information flyer 
summarizing the program, see SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE OFFICE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., CATCH A SERIAL OFFENDER (CATCH) PROGRAM VICTIM INFO SHEET, 
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CATCH Program representative or a sexual assault response coordinator 
contacts the victim to let them know. Victims can then use the new 
information to decide whether they want to convert their restricted report to 
an “unrestricted” report, which will allow a criminal investigation into the 
assault allegations to go forward.171 
 
2. Criminalizing sexual harassment 
 
A second significant recommendation made by Secretary of Defense 
Shanahan in his memo to the Armed Forces was that a punitive article directly 
criminalizing sexual harassment should be added to the UCMJ.172 To 
understand the significance of this recommendation, one must first 
understand that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply to 
uniformed members of the Armed Forces. Congress extended Title VII 
protections to federal employees, including “personnel actions affecting 
employees or applicants for employment . . . in military departments” in 
1972.173 However, civilian case law has firmly established that the term 
“military” in this sentence only refers to civilian employees working for the 
military branches; Title VII does not protect uniformed military personnel.174 




[hereinafter CATCH VICTIM INFO SHEET]. 
171 See Lopez, supra note 168 (illustrating a victim’s options in the CATCH program with a 
flow chart).  
172 See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 1.  
173 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 103, 111 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16). 
174 See, e.g., Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Overton v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Mil. & Naval Affs., 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. United States, 227 F.3d 
295, 299 (5th Cir. 2000); Coffman v. Michigan, 120 F.3d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 1997); Corey v. 
United States, No. 96-6409, 1997 WL 474521, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 1997); Randall v. 
United States, 95 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1996); Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537, 1541 
(11th Cir. 1987); Roper v. Dep’t of Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987); Salazar v. 
Heckler, 787 F.2d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1986); Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928–
29 (9th Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. 
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied 
review of the issue. See Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub 
nom. Jackson v. Braithwaite, No. 20-19, 2020 WL 6829074 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2020); Stinson 
v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 959 (1988); Johnson v. 
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S 986 (1978). For critiques of this 
doctrine, see Mary C. Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for 
Discrimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082 (1987); Westergard, supra note 40.  
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VII175 and the policy justification that extending Title VII to uniformed 
service members would interfere with military leaders’ ability to maintain 
good order and discipline within their units.176 
There is also an almost complete bar on service members’ ability to 
bring tort or other claims for damages against the United States government 
for injuries related to military service. This principle is known as the Feres 
doctrine, established in a 1950 Supreme Court case Feres v. United States.177 
The doctrine first barred claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act178 but 
federal courts subsequently extended it to preclude damage actions for 
violations of service members’ constitutional rights.179 Like the categorical 
exclusion of employment discrimination in the military from judicial review 
under Title VII, the Feres doctrine rests on the notion that allowing suits for 
damages for injuries sustained in military service would degrade the 
military’s ability to maintain order and discipline.180 Indeed courts have 
 
175 Specifically, courts have reasoned that the terms “Armed Forces” and “Military 
Departments” are defined individually and differently in the definitions section of Title 10 
of the U.S. Code, outlining the role of the Armed Forces, and that Congress referenced Title 
10 (at least indirectly) in the Title VII provision delineating employees subject to Title VII’s 
coverage. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928 (explaining that the different definitions for 
“armed forces” and “military departments” indicate that Congress intended there to be a 
distinction between the two terms, “the former consisting of civilian employees the latter of 
uniformed military personnel”).  
176 See Westergard, supra note 40, at 227–28. 
177 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).  
178 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680. The FTCA allows specific types of lawsuits against 
the federal government and federal employees who have acted within the scope of 
employment while causing injuries. 
179 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304–05 (1983) (barring claims for constitutional 
torts for uniformed service members). In Chappell, five sailors alleged that seven of their 
superior officers had discriminated against them because of their race. Id. at 297.  
180 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (“Feres seems best explained by the 
‘peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects the 
maintenance of such suits on discipline . . . .’’’). The Court also reasoned that existing 
statutory disability and death benefits for members of the military “compare extremely 
favorably” with those provided by workers’ compensation statutes, justifying displacement 
of tort damages. Feres, 340 U.S. at 159. The Supreme Court has subsequently upheld Feres 
in a number of contexts. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 (unanimously holding that no cause 
of action exists under the Constitution for tort suits by service members against other service 
members); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (expanding the Feres doctrine 
to encompass a tort claim arising from the murder of an off-duty service member off-base 
by another service member, even though the situation did not meet the traditional “incident 
to service” test); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987) (holding that the Feres 
doctrine barred a tort suit by members of the Coast Guard injured in a helicopter crash during 
a rescue mission although the tortfeasor, an FAA air traffic controller, was not a member of 
the military). But see Brown, 348 U.S. at 113 (holding that Feres does not bar claims of 
veterans after they have left military service). Feres has been subjected to sustained criticism. 
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cross-referenced these exceptions and, in doing so, broadly protected the 
military from the reach of civil law.181 
In sum, the legal claims civilian employees commonly use to address 
sexual harassment in the workplace are largely unavailable to uniformed 
service members. What is left is largely a matter of disciplining the 
perpetrator rather than compensating the victim.182 Because of the 
unavailability of civil remedies for sexual harassment in the military 
workplace, when military leaders, the Department of Defense, and Congress 
have sought to demonstrate a level of seriousness about sexual misconduct in 
the military, the tendency has been to lean toward more serious criminal 
punishments like courts-martial.183 To understand why adding a punitive 
article for sexual harassment to the UCMJ is a significant—and potentially 
problematic—recommendation, a brief explanation of military law is required.  
 
a. The military justice system 
 
The military justice system is separate from the civilian legal system. 
It derives its authority from the UCMJ, a statute enacted by Congress.184 
 
See Westergard, supra note 40, at 245 (documenting historical trends that contradict the 
policy considerations behind the Feres doctrine); see also discussion Section III.C. infra. 
181 See, e.g., Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223–24 (8th Cir. 1978) (reasoning that the 
Feres doctrine’s concern about military discipline justifies barring Title VII claims in the military). 
182 See Westergard, supra note 40, at 231 (arguing that because neither the UCMJ nor 
Department of Defense Equal Opportunity (EO) Program provides damages to service 
members who suffer discrimination, there is little incentive for service members to report 
given the risk of retaliation). 
183 See Greg Rustico, Note, Overcoming Overcorrection: Towards Holistic Military Sexual 
Assault Reform, 102 VA. L. REV. 2027, 2050–51 (2016) (citing various statements of high-
ranking officials, including President Obama, pushing for court-martial convictions for 
sexual assault). 
184 The Uniform Code of Military Justice is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946. The United 
States Constitution authorizes Congress to create a system of military justice. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress authority to raise and support armies, provide and 
maintain a navy, and providing for organizing, disciplining and regulating them); see also 
Dana Michael Hollywood, Creating a True Army of One: Four Proposals to Combat Sexual 
Harassment in Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 176 (2007) (discussing the 
historical justification for the maintenance of a separate legal system for military personnel); 
1 DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1-6, 
Lexis (database updated Sept. 2020) (providing a history of the U.S. military justice system). 
Traditionally, military commanders had inherent authority to discipline or punish their 
troops, and this has been incorporated into the UCMJ with respect to nonjudicial punishment. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, at I-1 (2019 ed.) 
[hereinafter MCM], https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20(Final)% 
20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610 [https://perma.cc/T22E-F9RZ] (“Military law 
consists of the statutes governing the military establishment and regulations issued 
thereunder, the constitutional powers of the President and regulations issued thereunder, and 
the inherent authority of military commanders.”). 
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Military courts interpret and enforce it.185 The original American Code of 
Military Justice predates the U.S. Constitution.186 The UCMJ took on its current 
form after World War II, a conflict in which roughly two million service 
members were court-martialed.187 As Commander in Chief, the President 
implements the UCMJ by executive order in a document called The Manual for 
Courts-Martial.188 It contains the Rules for Courts-Martial, Military Rules of 
Evidence, Punitive Articles, and Nonjudicial Punishment Procedures.189  
The UCMJ is unique because it serves not only as a system of justice 
to address offenses, but as a tool for military commanders to maintain order 
and discipline within a unit. As such, unit commanders have broad 
responsibility and discretion for deciding whether or not to discipline or 
charge soldiers in their units. Consequently, unit commanders play a critical 
role in military law. These are primarily company level officers, who are 
junior officers with roughly five to ten years of service.190 Depending on the 
branch of service and occupation, a company commander could be 
 
185 See Ortiz v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2165, 2170 (2018) (“In the exercise of its authority 
over the armed forces, Congress has long provided for specialized military courts to 
adjudicate charges against service members.”). 
186 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 939 (2015) 
(“In 1775, the Second Continental Congress codified the first American Articles of War, 
which, among other things, provided for courts-martial for certain prescribed offenses. The 
1775 Articles were reaffirmed (as amended) in 1776 and 1786.”). 
187 See SCHLUETER, supra note 184, § 1-6(E). Prior to and during World War II, each branch 
of the military had its own code of justice. Under the leadership of Professor Edmund M. 
Morgan, Jr., Congress enacted a uniform code with the Military Justice Act of 1950. Id. 
There have been updates to the UCMJ over the years, with the latest significant updates 
occurring in 2016 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. 
See Military Justice Act of 2016: Overview, OFF. OF THE JUDGE ADVOC. GEN., (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2019/01/10/ [https://perma.cc/R2GW-AYSX] (sum-
marizing major 2016 changes to the military justice code). 
188 Exec. Order No. 13825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
189 MCM, supra note 184, at i–xlii. The Rules for Courts-Martial are analogous to the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; Military Rules of Evidence are analogous to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  
190 See Stew Smith, Military Commissioned Officer Promotions, THE BALANCE CAREERS 
(July 17, 2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/military-commissioned-officer-promo 
tions-4055887 [https://perma.cc/7XW8-7VEN] (noting that promotion to the rank of Captain 
in all of the services typically takes four years and that nearly 100% qualify); see also 
KIMBERLY JACKSON, KATHERINE L. KIDDER, SEAN MANN, WILLIAM H. WAGGY II, 
NATASHA LANDER, S. REBECCA ZIMMERMAN, RAND CORP., RAISING THE FLAG: 
IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY APPROACHES TO GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER 
DEVELOPMENT 53–55, 55 fig.4.2 (2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ 
RR4347.html [https://perma.cc/3HAS-VETR] (reporting that from 2008 to 2018, the average 
years in service of rising Army officers in grade O-3/Captain was three years and O-4/Major 
was eleven years, respectively); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-29, OFFICER PROMOTIONS 
para. 2-7, at 7–8 (Sept. 9, 2020) (defining time in grade required for promotion to captain). 
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responsible for 80 to 200 soldiers and 4 to 5 subordinate officers.191 Unit 
commanders “lead military organizations and are primarily responsible for 
ensuring mission readiness, to include maintaining good order and discipline 
within military units.”192 They have the primary responsibility of leading 
their unit and setting mission priorities, but they also manage personnel 
administratively and have broad discretion to discipline troops, including 
bringing criminal charges under military law.193 In a sense, unit commanders 
are workplace supervisors, HR managers, and prosecutors all in one.194  
When a soldier is suspected of misconduct, their unit commander has 
three broad options to address the issue.195 The first is to take “administrative 
action,” which is the first measure a commander typically will turn to when 
addressing minor offenses.196 Administrative action may include oral or 
written counseling, admonition, reprimands, training, withholding of 
privileges, or a combination of these measures.197 Some of these measures 
may be more or less formal, and administrative actions are technically 
considered “corrective” actions rather than punishment.198 However, some 
 
191 See, e.g., Military Units, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/Experience/ 
Military-Units/Army/#army [https://perma.cc/DQR4-LAKK] (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) 
(noting that a typical Army Company is commanded by a Captain and comprised of 3 to 4 
platoons of up to 200 personnel). 
192 ROLE OF THE COMMANDER SUBCOMMITTEE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE ROLE OF 
THE COMMANDER SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE RESPONSE SYSTEMS TO ADULT SEXUAL ASSAULT 
CRIMES PANEL 2 (2014) [hereinafter ROLE OF THE COMMANDER SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT], 
https://responsesystemspanel.whs.mil/public/docs/Reports/02_RoC/ROC_Report_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SHJ9-RC9G]. This subcommittee was created by the Secretary of Defense 
on Sept. 23, 2012 as directed by Section 576(d)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2013. 
193 See U.S. ARMY, CRIMINAL LAW DESK BOOK: PRACTICING MILITARY JUSTICE 1–2 (2018) 
(“Commanders have a wide variety of options available to them to deal with disciplinary 
problems. These options include administrative actions ranging from an informal counseling . 
. . to punitive options such as punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, and trial by court-martial.”). 
194 See id. (“Prosecutorial discretion lies with the commander and not the judge advocate, a 
concept unfamiliar to civilian practitioners who are more accustomed to prosecutorial 
discretion being entrusted to a prosecuting attorney.”). 
195 However, commanders have wide latitude not to take any action if they deem it unnecessary. 
See MCM, supra note 184, at II-28 (R.C.M. 306(c)(1)) (“A commander may decide to take no 
action on an offense. If charges have been preferred, they may be dismissed.”). 
196 See id. (R.C.M 306(c)(2)) (“Administrative actions include corrective measures such as 
counseling, admonition, reprimand, exhortation, disapproval, criticism, censure, reproach, 
rebuke, extra military instruction, or the administrative withholding of privileges, or any 
combination of the above.”). 
197 Id. 
198 The Manual for Courts-Martial states that administrative actions are “corrective measures 
that promote efficiency and good order and discipline” and “are not punishment.” Id. at V-2 
(¶ 1.g.), II-28 (R.C.M. 306(c)(2)). However, some administrative measures such as letters of 
reprimand have been criticized as actually being de facto punishment in practice without 
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administrative actions can have serious consequences for a service member’s 
career progression by creating a permanent stain on their personnel file.199 
Commanders can also initiate “administrative separation” proceedings, which 
can result in a service member’s removal from the military.200 Commanders 
have broad discretion to take corrective actions,201 even for more serious 
administrative actions like a formal written reprimand placed in a soldier’s 
personnel record.202 Such written reprimands must only meet federal records 
standards,203 be “true and just,”204 and supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence.205 Soldiers can apply to restrict access to unfavorable records if they 
can show rehabilitation and the support of their commanding officer,206 
 
 
significant due process protections, and even Congress states that “punitive administrative 
action” can result following sex-related offenses. See Captain Mark E. Bojan, Bad Paper: 
Reforming the Army Reprimand Process, 224 MIL. L. REV. 1150, 1154 (2016) (citing 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66 § 1745, 127 
Stat. 672 (2013)). 
199 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-37, UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION paras. 3-4(a)–
(b), at 4 (Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter ARMY REG. 600-37] (authorizing a General Officer 
Order of Reprimand); see also Bojan, supra note 198, at 1170 (“[T]here is a widely-held 
belief—by judge advocates who advise commanders, by soldiers generally, and by 
civilians—that an OMPF-filed reprimand is a ‘career-killer.’”). 
200 See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1180–81 (“The consequences of administrative separation 
are severe, and may include loss of benefits, reduction in grade, and a characterization of 
discharge of other than honorable (OTH) upon discharge or separation.”) . 
201 See MCM, supra note 184, at II-28 (R.C.M. 306(c)(2)). 
202 See, e.g., ARMY REG. 600-37, supra note 199, para. 2–5(a), at 2 (authorizing commanders 
to “take appropriate action(s) . . . concerning members of their commands” with reference to 
unfavorable information placed in a soldier’s personnel record). 
203 Id. at 3–2(c) (providing that the unfavorable information “must meet [federal records 
standards] of accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness.”). 
204 Id. at 6–3(a)(4) (providing that soldiers who believe the unfavorable information filed in 
their personnel record is “untrue or unjust” may submit an appeal requesting the removal of the 
information and that such appeals must be supported by “clear and convincing evidence”). 
205 Id. at 6–3(b)(1)(a) (providing that unfavorable information referred to a soldier’s 
personnel record is investigated and evaluated by a review board (the Department of the 
Army Suitability Evaluation Board (DASEB)), which determines if there is “credible 
evidence to support a finding, by preponderance of the evidence, that the unfavorable 
information is valid”). The DASEB can close a case if it determines that the information is 
already adequately reflected in the soldier’s personnel file or is not of such a serious nature 
or type that it should be filed in the record. Id. at 6–3(c)(2)(a)–(c). It can also decide that the 
unfavorable information is of such a serious nature that it should be made a part of the 
soldier’s record. Id. at 6–3(b)(1)(b). In making its determination, the DASEB “will consider 
serious individual incidents, as well as a pattern of lesser incidents, that may reflect 
unfavorably on the Soldier’s character, integrity, trustworthiness, or reliability.” Id. 
206 For example, in the Army, a soldier who believes the unfavorable information in their 
personnel record has “served [its] intended purpose[]” may request that the unfavorable 
information be transferred to the “restricted” portion of their personnel file. Id. at 6–3(a)(5). 
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although in practice this remedy is rare.207 
The next form of action a commander can take is “nonjudicial 
punishment” under Article 15 of the UCMJ. Colloquially referred to as an 
“Article 15” or “NJP,” this is a form of punishment typically used for minor 
offenses under military law, somewhat analogous to misdemeanor offenses 
in civilian criminal law.208 This is considered a punitive rather than corrective 
measure, but the punishment is “nonjudicial” because the soldier will not be 
facing court-martial, and punishment under Article 15 does not result in a 
federal criminal conviction.209 The Manual for Courts-Martial states that 
nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 is meant to act as a disciplinary 
measure when administrative corrections are inadequate but a commander 
wishes to “promote[] positive behavior changes . . . without the stigma of a 
court-martial conviction.”210 This gives a commander the ability to punish 
soldiers for minor offenses without the more time-consuming and (career-
killing) process of a court-martial.211 Interestingly, Article 15 of the UCMJ 
does not proscribe a particular burden of proof; rather, different branches of 
the military have set their own standards as a matter of policy.212 For example, 
the Navy uses a preponderance standard for Article 15 punishments, whereas 
the Army and Air Force use a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard as in 
 
Among other requirements, the soldier’s chain of command at the time of the imposition of 
the reprimand must support the record(s)’ transfer. Id. at 7–2(e)(3). Such transfers are made 
upon a finding of substantial evidence that the purpose of the document has been served and 
transfer is in the “best interest of the Army.” Id. at 7–2(d)(1)(b)–(c). Once transferred, 
restricted records will “not normally serve as the sole basis for promotion” decisions. Id. at 
7–2(d)(3)(e).  
207 See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1175–76 (noting that appeals are limited to soldiers grade 
E-6 and above, and stating that appeal standards are “exceedingly high,” with remedies 
beyond appeal to the DASEB being even more “rarified”). 
208 What constitutes a “minor offense” is, again, up the commander’s discretion, but they are 
typically offenses under a punitive Article (Articles 77–134) where the maximum penalty 
would not include dishonorable discharge or confinement for 1 year. See MCM, supra note 
184, at V-1–V-4 (outlining the procedures, limitations, and maximum punishments for 
nonjudicial punishment). 
209 See id. at V-1 (“Nonjudicial punishment provides commanders with an essential and 
prompt means of maintaining good order and discipline and also promotes positive behavior 
changes in Servicemembers without the stigma of a court-martial conviction.”). 
210 See id.; see also Katherine Gorski, Comment, Nonjudicial Punishment in the Military: Why 
a Lower Burden of Proof Across All Branches is Unnecessary, 2 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 83, 91 (2013). 
211 Gorski, supra note 210, at 89.  
212 See id.; see also LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 155–
56 (2010) (noting the silence of Article 15 on the burden of proof standard and summarizing 
burdens commonly adopted by each military branch). 
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criminal courts-martial.213 There are maximum penalties under Article 15, 
but these could include forfeiture of pay or a reduction in rank.214  
Finally, commanding officers may recommend charges for court-
martial.215 Three types of courts-martial exist, though all are criminal in 
nature. The first is a Summary Court-Martial, where the unit commander 
alone hears evidence and decides guilt or innocence, and the soldier is not 
afforded counsel or a jury. Summary Courts-Martial are limited in scope and 
reserved for minor offenses.216 Next is a Special Court-Martial, which is 
analogous to a civilian misdemeanor offense and proceeding. Sometimes a 
military judge sitting alone will hear the case; other times a trial counsel and 
jurors become involved.217 The last kind of court-martial is a General Court-
Martial and would be analogous to a civilian felony judicial proceeding. 
General Courts-Martial entail a military judge, counsel, and jurors, as well as 
a preliminary hearing before neutral officers to determine if there is probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed the offense.218 A guilty verdict by 
General Court-Martial is a federal criminal conviction under the United States 
Code and can be reported on the guilty party’s record.219 The offenses triable 
by court-martial are listed in Articles 77–134 of the UCMJ, referred to as the 
 
213 See SCHLUETER, supra note 184, § 3-5(A)(2); Gorski, supra note 210, at 87, 89–90. 
214 See 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (noting that, while maximum punishments depend on the rank of 
commanding officer and rank of the individual being punished, forfeiture of pay is typically 
limited to not more than one half of one month’s pay for two months, and reduction of rank 
can be to the lowest rank for enlisted personnel, except for noncommissioned officers, where 
rank cannot be reduced more than two pay grades). 
215 See MCM, supra note 184, at II-48–II-49 (R.C.M. 407(a)(4), –(6)). 
216 Id. at II-198 (R.C.M. 1301(b)) (noting that the function of the summary court-martial is 
to “promptly adjudicate minor offenses under a simple disciplinary proceeding” and to 
“thoroughly and impartially inquire into both sides of the matter,” ensuring that the “interests 
of both the Government and the accused are safeguarded and that justice is done.”). 
217 See id. at II-51–II-52 (R.C.M. 502(d)(1)(B)) (detailing the activities of trial counsel in 
Special Courts-Martial); id. at II-50 (R.C.M. 501(a)(2)) (detailing the composition of the 
body presiding over a Special Court-Martial). 
218 Id. at chs. III–VIII (R.C.M. 301–813) (describing the court-martial process).  
219 Court-martial convictions are recorded and reported to the Criminal Justice Information 
Services (CJIS) Division of the FBI for inclusion in the FBI’s criminal history database (the 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database) for dissemination to state and local 
law enforcement agencies. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 5505.11, FINGERPRINT 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 6 (Oct. 31, 2019); About NCIC, NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION 
CENTER (NCIC), https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic [https://perma.cc/PD37-MYYP] (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2021). Additionally, a dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, which are 
punishments for a court-martial conviction, must be indicated by a “character code” on a 
servicemember’s DD-214, the official record of service frequently requested by civilian 
employers. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 1336.01, CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE OR DISCHARGE 
FROM ACTIVE DUTY 10, 13 (Aug. 20, 2009). 
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“Punitive Articles.” Each Article lists the elements for the offense at issue.220 In 
all types of courts-martial, guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.221  
 
b. A punitive article for sexual harassment 
 
Former Secretary of Defense Shanahan’s recommendation to add a 
punitive article for sexual harassment is significant because, unlike sexual 
assault—which is specifically punishable as a crime under Article 120—
sexual harassment does not have an associated punitive article.222 This has 
meant that a service member could not be directly court-martialed for 
engaging in sexual harassment, even though the Department of Defense has 
a strict no-tolerance policy related to sexual harassment. Therefore, conduct 
that would otherwise constitute sexual harassment can be tried as a punitive 
offense by court-martial only by shoehorning it into the elements of other 
UCMJ offenses.223 Essentially, it is a prosecution of conduct that may be 
interpreted as sexual harassment in a civilian workplace but which violates 
another crime under the UCMJ.224 
One of the more common punitive articles used to prosecute sexual 
harassment is Article 93, “Cruelty and Maltreatment.”225 Article 93.a. states 
that “[a]ny person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or 
oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be 
punished as a court-martial may direct.”226 Article 93.c.(2) does provide 
clarification that “sexual harassment may constitute this offense.”227 
However, because the maltreated individual must be “subject to the orders” 
of the accused, the sexual harasser must have formal or informal authority 
 
220 See MCM, supra note 184, at IV-1–IV-151 (Articles 77–134) (codified at 10 U.S.C §§ 
877–934) (listing and describing the offenses that may be tried by court-martial). 
221 Id. at II-134 (R.C.M. 918(c)); id. at A8-7. 
222 SAAITF REPORT, supra note 140, at 18.  
223 See Hollywood, supra note 184, at 178–79. 
224 See J. Richard Chema, Arresting “Tailhook”: The Prosecution of Sexual Harassment in 
the Military, 140 MIL. L. REV. 1, 43–58 (1994) (exploring the use of existing UCMJ articles 
to punish sexual harassment―such as articles on maltreatment, rape, carnal knowledge, 
sodomy, assault, indecent assault, abusing a position of authority, fraternization, conduct 
unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman, violating general orders, extortion, and use of 
indecent language―and the mismatch between the offense of sexual harassment and the 
articles examined in many instances).  
225 MCM, supra note 184, at IV–29 (Art. 93) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 893). 
226 Id. The elements of the offense are: “(1) that a certain person was subject to the orders of 
the accused, and (2) that the accused was cruel toward, or oppressed, or maltreated that person.”  
227 Id. Further, sexual harassment is defined in this subsection to include “influencing, offering 
to influence, or threatening the career, pay, or job of another person in exchange for sexual 
favors” (i.e., “quid pro quo” sexual harassment) and “deliberate or repeated offensive 
comments or gestures of a sexual nature” (i.e., “hostile work environment” sexual harassment). 
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over the victim.228 This may address classic quid pro quo sexual harassment 
or sexual harassment by a supervising officer, but it precludes prosecution of 
peer-to-peer harassment in the normal course. This limitation is especially 
problematic, since sexual misconduct in the military occurs most often 
between junior enlisted service members who are peers or near peers in 
rank.229 Such imprecision demonstrates the problem of having to fit sexual 
harassment into existing punitive articles that do not specifically address 
sexual harassment.230  
Furthermore, sexual harassment has at times been tried by court-
martial under UCMJ Article 92, “Failure to Obey a Lawful Order or 
Regulation,”231 since sexual harassment is prohibited by regulation in all 
branches of the Armed Forces.232 However, only violations of “punitive” 
regulations can be charged as a “failure to obey” offense under Article 92.233 
“Punitive” in this context refers to the fact that not all regulations are meant 
to result in criminal punishment for a failure to follow them.234 Military 
regulations contain a vast array of general guidelines of a technical, advisory, 
 
228 Id. (Art. 93.c.(1)) (“‘Any person subject to his orders’ means not only those persons under 
the direct or immediate command of the accused but extends to all persons, subject to the 
UCMJ or not, who by reason of some duty are required to obey the lawful orders of the accused, 
regardless of whether the accused is in the direct chain of command over the person.”).  
229 See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 23 
(“Alleged perpetrators are often the same rank, or slightly higher, than the victim.”). 
230 See Hollywood, supra note 184, at 178–83 (“Although the UCMJ offers some possibilities 
for prosecuting sexual harassment, until Congress chooses to expressly prohibit sexual 
harassment in the punitive articles of the UCMJ, many prosecutions will fail for lack of an 
appropriate provision, ‘leaving military prosecutors to leap Herculean legal hurdles.’”).  
231 See, e.g., United States v. Murray, No. 201800163, 2019 WL 6608798, at *2 (N-M. Ct. 
Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2019). Article 92.a(1) states that “[a]ny person subject to this chapter 
who . . . violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation . . . shall be punished 
as a court-martial may direct.” MCM, supra note 184, at IV–27 (Art. 92) (codified at 10 
U.S.C. § 892). The elements of the offense are: “(a) That there was in effect a certain lawful 
general order or regulation; (b) That the accused had a duty to obey it; and (c) That the 
accused violated or failed to obey the order or regulation.” Id. 
232 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY (July 24, 2020) 
[hereinafter ARMY REG. 600-20]; U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, POL’Y DIR. 36-27, EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY (Mar. 18, 2019); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, U.S. NAVY REGS., 1990, art. 1166 
(Sept. 14, 1990).  
233 See MCM, supra note 184, at IV-28 (¶ 18.c.(1)(e)) (“Not all provisions in general orders or 
regulations can be enforced under Article 92(1). Regulations which only supply general guidelines 
or advice for performing military functions may not be enforceable under Article 92(1).”). 
234 See U.S. v. Nardell, 45 C.M.R. 101, 103 (C.M.A. 1972) (“No single characteristic of a 
general order [or regulation] determines whether it applies punitively to members of a 
command. . . . The order in its entirety must demonstrate that rather than providing general 
guidelines for the conduct of military functions it is basically intended to regulate conduct of 
individual members and that its direct application of sanctions for its violation is self-evident.”).  
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or organizational nature.235 Because due process requires fair notice that an 
act is criminal before prosecution,236 military courts have required clear, 
direct language of prohibition in regulations for a criminal conviction under 
Article 92.237 This principle has generated a split among the services as to 
whether military regulations proscribing sexual harassment are punitive. 
For example, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals has 
determined that the Navy regulation prohibiting sexual harassment is 
punitive, thus allowing violations of the Navy’s sexual harassment regulation 
to be charged under Article 92.238 Recently, the Air Force Court of Criminal 
Appeals came to a similar conclusion.239 Conversely, a 1990 Army appellate 
 
235 See Captain John B. DiChiara, USAF, Article 92: Judicial Guidelines for Identifying 
Punitive Orders and Regulations, 17 A.F. L. REV. 61, 62–63 (1975). 
236 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974). 
237 See DiChiara, supra note 235, at 63. 
238 United States v. Olivares, No. 201800125, 2019 WL 1076454, at *4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 
Mar. 7, 2019) (en banc) (per curiam), review denied, 79 M.J. 187 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (“We find 
that the term sexual harassment [in Article 1166, U.S. Navy Regulations] is sufficiently 
precise as to be capable of serving as a code of behavior that service members can be 
expected to follow. . . . We find, therefore, that the military judge erred by determining that 
Article 1166 is not a punitive general regulation.”). Olivares was an interlocutory appeal 
concerning a charge that the defendant said to a PO2 “‘let me see that ass’ [then] kissed her 
and touched her buttocks.” Id. at *4. See also United States v. Murray, No. 201800163, 2019 
WL 6608798, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2019) (reasoning that the holding in 
Olivares equally applies to the Marine Corps as a component of the Navy); United States v. 
Rosario, NMCCA 201500251, 2015 WL 9942096, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 
2015) (upholding the conviction of a Marine sergeant under Article 92 for repeatedly 
expressing his romantic interest in a corporal, asking her how often she has sex with her 
husband, making a copy of her apartment key and threatening to “come over,” and kissing 
her and sticking his tongue in her ear, among other unwelcome conduct; “considering all the 
relevant facts . . . we have no difficulty concluding that a person of ordinary intelligence 
could reasonably understand the regulation [Marine Corps Manual and Navy Instruction 
5300.26] proscribed the appellant’s conduct.”); United States v. Jackson, NMCCA 
200900427, 2010 WL 2059046, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. May 25, 2010) (upholding 
special court-martial for violation of Navy regulation prohibiting sexual harassment and 
UCMJ Articles 92 and 120).  
239 United States v. Da Silva, No. ACM 39599, 2020 WL 3468282, at *10 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 
App. June 25, 2020) (upholding the conviction of an Air Force recruiter under Article 92 for 
making sexual advances on two female recruits after driving them to remote locations in his 
car; military case law, regulations, policies, and recruiter training, as well as Title VII 
regulations, put the defendant on fair notice that his conduct constituted “making sexual 
advances” and sexual harassment, subject to criminal sanction); United States v. Pope, 63 
M.J. 68, 72–74 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (upholding the conviction of an Air Force recruiter under 
Article 92 for coming on to three recruits, ages sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen; Air Force 
Instruction AETCI 36-2002 proscribing hostile work environment sexual harassment 
“provided ample discussion of the types of behavior prohibited by the regulation and a 
reasonable person would have been on notice that misconduct of the sort engaged in by 
Appellant was subject to criminal sanction.”). 
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decision, United States v. Asman,240 held that the Army regulation prohibiting 
sexual harassment is not punitive in nature. The DOD and the Army have 
subsequently issued many regulations and instructions clearly defining and 
proscribing sexual harassment, and the other services have held that sexual 
harassment is chargeable under Article 92, calling the continued viability of 
Asman into question. However, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Services 
(the highest military court) has declined to weigh in. Thus, it seems that 
charges under Article 92 for sexual harassment remain unavailable in the 
Army. Prosecuting sexual harassment under Article 134, the “catch-all” of 
the UCMJ prohibiting conduct prejudicial to “good order and discipline,”241 
has been largely unsuccessful.242 In sum, sexual harassment in the Armed 
Forces has been ineffectively addressed through a patchwork of policies and 
ancillary criminal provisions in the UCMJ. 
 
C. Assessing the Military’s Response 
 
The CATCH program and the criminalization of sexual harassment 
are steps in the right direction. But these reforms fall short in fundamental 
respects and are therefore unlikely to effectively address—and may even 
exacerbate—sexual harassment in the military. In the discussion that follows, 
we highlight the features of these proposals that are commendable, while 
noting several critical shortfalls that render them impractical, ill-fitting, and 
ineffective. We offer this analysis with the hope that the military will correct 
 
240 See United States v. Asfeld, 30 M.J. 917, 922 (A.C.M.R. 1990) (reasoning that U.S. Dep’t 
of Army Reg. 600-21, the precursor to the current Army regulation prohibiting sexual 
harassment, Reg. 600-27, was non-punitive, because it was only incorporated by reference 
into the Army’s main EEO regulation, Army Reg. 600-50). 
241 Jane Gross, Justice in the Military Has Its Reasons, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 1998), https:// www. 
nytimes.com/1998/03/01/us/justice-in-the-military-has-its-reasons.html [https://perma.cc/ 
ZW5J-CGBY] (“Article 134 is the catch-all of this nation’s military justice system, a 
compendium of 55 offenses that the armed forces say are ‘prejudicial to good order and 
discipline’ or likely to ‘bring discredit’ on the service.”). 
242 See, e.g., United States v. Peszynski, 40 M.J. 874, 879–880 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1994). 
(overturning a conviction of a service member who subjected female co-workers at a Pizza 
Hut aboard a Naval air station to “a nearly constant stream of sexually suggestive comments 
and other forms of sexually suggestive behavior,” including “making frequent reference to 
their breasts and buttocks,” “ask[ing] them out socially,” “star[ing] leeringly at their bodies,” 
and “touching or stroking” them in a “sexually suggestive” manner, over a five month period, 
even though “[e]ach victim made it clear to the appellant that she wanted him to stop”; such 
“[c]omments and gestures . . . are not inherently criminal or even necessarily pejorative in nature; 
they are basically neutral. As such, they do not serve as an adequate standard by which to 
determine criminal behavior.”); cf. United States v. Creighton, No. Army 20010208, 2003 WL 
25945393, at *2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 22, 2003) (overturning a conviction of an unmanned 
aerial vehicle instructor for engaging in an unprofessional relationship with trainees, including 
driving two females in his car off base and engaging in sexual intercourse with a trainee, finding 
“no convincing evidence” that his conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline). 
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these flaws in its existing programs and undertake additional reforms 
responding to sexual harassment. 
 
1. The downsides of anonymous reporting 
 
The CATCH program incorporates several features that may enhance 
the military’s ability to identify and address sexual misconduct. However, it 
also has several design flaws, which we discuss here. Without more 
fundamental reforms in the military justice system, such as assigning 
independent authority to investigate and discipline sexual harassment outside 
the chain of command243 and making compensatory damages for sexual 
harassment available,244 our assessment is that CATCH does not add much 
to the military’s response to sexual misconduct. 
Assessing CATCH in its most favorable light, feminist experts on sex 
crimes and violence against women have highlighted how mandatory arrest 
and “no-drop” prosecution policies require victims to hand over power to a 
potentially unfriendly justice system in order to obtain redress.245 In this 
regard, the CATCH design is congruent with these feminist critiques. It gives 
victims more agency and control over the process by offering them a way to 
report sexual harassment without exposing themselves to a full-blown 
adversarial process. A victim’s ability to report anonymously may be even 
more critical in the military than in civilian workplaces, given that retaliation 
for reporting sexual misconduct in the military is rampant.246 Indeed, the 
military’s most recent workplace gender relations survey finds that service 
members value the option of restricted reporting. “Without the option to make 
a restricted report, only 11% of women . . . responded that they would have 
sought out civilian confidential resources, and nearly half of women . . . 
responded that they would not have submitted a report [of sexual assault] at 
all.”247 The CATCH program is also an excellent data collection tool, 
enabling the military to track the prevalence of sexual misconduct and 
identify repeat offenders. 
Despite these clear benefits, the CATCH program can be criticized on 
several grounds. As currently designed, the CATCH system permits the 
military to sit on information demonstrating serious crimes, repeat offenses, 
and systemic sex discrimination if a victim does not file an unrestricted 
report. This system irrationally relieves the military of responsibility even if 
 
243 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
244 See discussion infra Section III.C. 
245 See GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 23, at 20; G. Kristian 
Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of 
the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 293–302, 321–23 (2005). 
246 See sources cited supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text. 
247 See 2018 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at vii. 
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it knows of the conduct. And by placing the onus on victims to make formal 
unrestricted reports before the military responds to a complaint,248 the 
program unfairly places the burden on victims to take the lead in addressing 
what is more accurately characterized as a systemic, institutional problem. In 
practice, this design leaves a victim with fundamentally the same dilemma 
they had before the military implemented CATCH. If a victim wants the 
military to investigate a claim of sexual misconduct, they must formally 
involve their chain of command, presenting the same high risk of retaliation 
or adverse treatment.249 While the CATCH system is designed to “empower 
victims to participate in the military justice process,”250 it places victims in the 
difficult position of knowing that a repeat offender could remain at large if they 
choose not to expose themselves to the military justice system and their chain 
of command. Ultimately, without more fundamental reform of the military 
justice system,251 the CATCH program is unlikely to disrupt the current barriers 
to making an unrestricted, nonanonymous report. 
An extensive body of research in the civilian context documents why 
people who experience sexual harassment (primarily women) do not report 
the harassment or delay reporting. One of the primary reasons is shame and 
embarrassment, which often causes the person to blame themselves for the 
misconduct.252 We all want to believe that we have control over what happens 
to us. When that personal power is challenged by a violation, a victim feels 
humiliation253 and shame,254 often accompanied by an intense fear of 
exposure.255 As a result of this discomfort, a person often will decide to keep 
 
248 See CATCH VICTIM INFO SHEET, supra note 170 (“If you decide to convert your report to an 
Unrestricted Report . . . the investigator is given your name at this time. A criminal investigation 
is now started, and the suspect’s commander and your commander are notified.”). 
249 Although conceivably there should be less fear of retaliation if the perpetrator is from a 
different unit, or even a different branch of service, attaching one’s name to a formal sexual 
assault complaint is still a significant step for a victim, as it involves direct leadership. Those 
who file complaints may still be perceived as “making problems.” 
250 See Lopez, supra note 168, at 5 (quoting Elizabeth Van Winkle, Executive Director of 
DOD’s Office of Force Resiliency in discussing the purpose of Sexual Assault Prevention 
and Response programs). 
251 See discussion infra Part III proposing reforms to the military justice system that would 
remove sexual harassment investigations and punishment decisions from the chain of 
command, rely on UCMJ administrative actions employing a civil burden of proof to address 
sexual harassment, and make compensatory damages available to victims. 
252 See Beverly Engel, Why Don’t Victims of Sexual Harassment Come Forward Sooner?, 




254 See Gershen Kaufman, The Meaning of Shame: Toward a Self-Affirming Identity, 21 J. 
COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 568, 569 (1974). 
255 Id. 
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the information about sexual harassment or assault to themselves, avoid the 
perpetrator, and try to forget the experience ever happened.256 Fear is also a 
significant obstacle to reporting. Fear of not being believed, of being labeled 
as a troublemaker, of retaliation, and that reporting will not improve the 
situation all contribute to a victim’s decision not to report or to delay in 
reporting.257 These fears are entirely rational, as many studies demonstrate 
that disbelief, refusal, and retaliation are common responses when individuals 
complain about sexual assault and harassment.258 Because of their double 
vulnerability, Black women are even less likely to report sexual harassment 
than white women.259  
 
256 Id.  
257 See Beiner, supra note 22, at 312–25 (discussing studies on the reasons that the vast 
majority of harassment victims do not report, including fears that they will lose their jobs, 
that they will not be believed, and that it will not help their situations); Hébert, supra note 
22, at 724–42 (identifying discomfort and embarrassment, fear of being labeled as a 
troublemaker, not being believed, threats of termination, fear of retaliation, and concerns 
about physical safety as reasons, among others, for not reporting sexual harassment); Kessler, 
supra note 22, at 1048 (discussing workplace power dynamics and economic vulnerabilities 
that lead victims not to report harassment); Engel, supra note 252 (“Fear of the repercussions 
is a huge obstacle women face when it comes to reporting sexual harassment or assault . . . .”). 
258 See Mindy E. Bergman, Regina Day Langhout, Patrick A. Palmieri, Lilia M. Cortina & 
Louise F. Fitzgerald, The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences 
of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 230, 233, 237 (2002) (noting that 
“organizational responses may function as a continuation of the harassing behavior” and 
finding, in a study of 6417 military personnel, that reporting sexual harassment “often 
triggers retaliation”); Lauren B. Edelman & Jessica Cabrera, Sex-Based Harassment and 
Symbolic Compliance, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 374 (2020) (“HR professionals 
frequently discourage women who inquire about filing a complaint from framing their 
complaints as sexual harassment, instead suggesting that the behavior is not sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment or that it is simply an instance of poor 
management or of interpersonal conflict.”); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: 
Violence Against Women in the Workplace, 48 AM. PSYCH. 1070, 1072 (1993) (“As with 
rape, women are commonly blamed for provoking sexual harassment and accounts of their 
experiences are routinely disbelieved.”); Jeong-Yeon Lee, Sharon Gibson Heilmann & Janet 
P. Near, Blowing the Whistle on Sexual Harassment: Test of a Model of Predictors and 
Outcomes, 57 HUM. RELS. 297, 318 (2004) (concluding, based on a study of 13,000 federal 
government employees, that “many cases of harassment do not end after the initial 
harassment but continue, as the target blows the whistle about the harassment and then 
suffers retaliation—a result that is entirely consistent with findings from earlier whistle-
blowing research”); Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness 
and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 L. & SOC. REV. 83, 98–105 (2005) 
(finding that complaint handlers in a university setting frequently sided with harassers and 
told employees who sought their help that their experiences were not sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to be considered sexual harassment); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: 
Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1 passim (2017) 
(discussing the deeply skeptical orientation toward rape accusers and examining the 
implications of this credibility discounting for institutional reform and law). 
259 See Hernández, supra note 22, at 1244–45. 
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These psychological dynamics and obstacles are exacerbated in the 
military setting. Service members are taught discipline, focus, and control 
from the first day of their training;260 they are “expected to be disciplined in 
their actions and words and to maintain control of their emotions and their 
physical selves at all times.”261 This culture is inconsistent with admitting 
vulnerability and violation, especially for female service members who may 
already feel that they are unwelcome and must prove themselves by being as 
tough as their male peers. 
Additionally, unit cohesiveness is essential, not just for mission 
efficiency, but also the core military value “[l]eave no one behind.”262 Service 
members are trained so that “[n]o soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine will be 
left on the field of battle,” even if that means disregarding a member’s own 
safety.263 Reporting misconduct by another service member in one’s unit 
disrupts this system of cohesion and sacrifice. 
Finally, and importantly, in a military workplace, the chain of 
command is king, a principle ingrained from the instant an individual first 
puts on a uniform. Service members are trained to operate within this strict, 
hierarchal system.264 Each service member is assigned a commanding officer 
responsible for addressing that individual’s concerns or problems. “‘Jumping 
the chain of command’ in most situations is strictly forbidden and may result 
in formal or informal disciplinary action.”265 This hierarchy creates severe 
barriers to reporting sexual misconduct when the alleged perpetrator is a 
service member’s commander, further multiplied because the victim must 
rely on the commander for their safety and well-being.266 In this way, the 
chain of command in the military functions in many respects as a cage, 
making it difficult if not impossible to go over a supervisor’s head when the 
supervisor is the harasser. 
These unique features of military culture further entrench and 
exacerbate common barriers to reporting sexual harassment. In the face of 
such extreme barriers, CATCH, by itself, does not seem to contribute much 
to the military’s response to sexual misconduct. We do not doubt that the 
CATCH will induce increased anonymous reporting, and preliminary data 
suggest that it has had this effect.267 Moreover, filing a restricted report 
 
260 See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SVC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SVCS., 
UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY: THE INSTITUTION, THE CULTURE, AND THE PEOPLE 10 (2010). 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 9. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 8. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 13. 
267 See DOD FY 2019 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, APP. B, supra note 146, at 7 (reporting 
a 17% increase in restricted (anonymous) reports in FY 2019 compared to FY 2018). 
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enables victims to access confidential counseling and health services.268 The 
CATCH program may also increase perceptions that the military treats 
victims with dignity and respect by affording privacy, confidentiality, and 
decisional autonomy. Increased confidence may, in turn, encourage more 
victims or witnesses of sexual misconduct to come forward.269 The CATCH 
system also gives victims time to seek relevant information and support in 
order to make more informed decisions about participating in an unrestricted 
(nonanonymous) criminal investigation.270 This additional time may 
eventually lead the victim to decide to pursue an investigation and convert a 
restricted report to an unrestricted one.271  
But there are serious limitations to restricted reporting. First, the 
perpetrator cannot be held accountable and may be capable of assaulting 
other victims.272 In addition, victims cannot receive a military protective 
order or request an expedited transfer without making an unrestricted 
report.273 Moreover, the victim may continue to have contact with the 
perpetrator. Finally, although a victim may, at any time, convert a restricted 
report to an unrestricted report,274 thereby triggering the investigation 
process, the delay in switching to an unrestricted report will likely present 
“significant obstacles” in the investigation.275 For example, evidence from 
any crime scene could be lost.276 More broadly, in the current environment 
and institutional context―that is, where unit commanders handle sexual 
misconduct investigations,277 retaliation for reporting is common,278 no 
formal action results from filing an anonymous report, and economic 
remedies are unavailable to victims―the primary function of CATCH seems 
to be “catching” data rather than perpetrators. Again, CATCH is a step in the 
right direction; it provides a mechanism to identify repeat offenders and 
connect victims with services. But it is not enough. More fundamental 
reforms to the UCMJ are necessary to create a meaningful response that 
deters sexual harassment and holds perpetrators accountable.279 
 
268 Id. at 5. 
269 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 6495.02, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 
(SAPR) PROGRAM PROCEDURES 39 (Sept. 11, 2020). 
270 Id. 
271 Id.  
272 See Restricted Reporting, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & 
RESPONSE, https://sapr.mil/restricted-reporting [https://perma.cc/5VR5-9VUR] (last visited 






278 See sources cited supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text. 
279 See discussion infra Part III. 
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2. Criminalization: too much and too little 
 
The Department of Defense’s call to add a punitive article for sexual 
harassment to the UCMJ is, no doubt, a response to external criticisms and 
awareness of its failure to effectively address sexual misconduct. Military 
lawyers have also proposed this reform.280 However, adding sexual 
harassment to the UCMJ is quite a bit more complicated than meets the eye. 
Congress and military courts will have to sort out several significant legal 
issues, both substantive and procedural, if a direct avenue for criminal 
prosecution of sexual harassment in the military is to be established.281 
First, the elements of a criminal sexual harassment offense would 
have to be defined. The Department of Defense did not elaborate on this when 
it recommended a new punitive article covering this conduct.282 While it is 
true that the military has historically criminalized some behavior that is not 
criminal in civilian society,283 this does not provide guidance as to how sexual 
harassment would be treated as a criminal offense under the UCMJ. 
 
280 See e.g., Hollywood, supra note 184, at 184–85. Proposals to add a stand-alone article to 
the UCMJ outlawing sexual harassment go back all the way to the 1980s. See SHIRLEY 
SAGAWA & NANCY DUFF CAMPBELL, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 8 (1992) (explaining that the Navy proposed amending the UCMJ 
in the wake of Tailhook). 
281 Because criminal offenses under the UCMJ are listed in Title 10 of U.S. Code, the 
Department of Defense cannot unilaterally alter or create new offenses. However, it may 
make recommendations or propose drafts of new article to Congress. See e.g., SAAITF 
REPORT, supra note 140, at 17–19 (recommending that the Joint Service Committee for 
Military Justice draft a proposal of a specific sexual harassment offense to be added to the 
Manual for Courts-Martial). 
282 This is true both in the Memo from Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, as well as the 
underlying recommendation from the Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation Task 
Force in 2019. See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 1 (“Implement the 
recommendations of the SAAITF Report, including taking steps to seek a stand-alone 
military crime of sexual harassment.”); see also SAAITF REPORT, supra note 140, at 19 
(2019) (recommending only that a proposal be drafted with no further details). 
283 For example, adultery is a criminal offense under the UCMJ, albeit narrowed in scope 
since 2002. See MCM, supra note 184, at IV-144–IV-146 (Article 134) (detailing that 
extramarital sexual conduct may be punished by “[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.”); Exec. Order No. 13,262, 3 C.F.R. 210 
(2003) (“To constitute an offense under the UCMJ, the adulterous conduct must either be 
directly prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting. Adulterous conduct 
that is directly prejudicial includes conduct that has an obvious, and measurably divisive 
effect on unit or organization discipline, morale, or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to the 
authority or stature of or respect toward a servicemember.”); see also MCM, supra note 184, 
at IV-145 (Article 134), ¶ 99.c.(1). Similarly, fraternization, gambling with a subordinate, 
indecent language, and violating orders (e.g., sexual relations onboard a ship), all are 
potentially subject to criminal sanction under Articles 134 and 92, respectively. Id. at IV-
127, IV-146–IV-148. 
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So far, the Department of Defense has defined sexual harassment only 
as a matter of policy through Directives (“DODD”s)284 and Instructions 
(“DODI”s),285 which establish DOD policies and procedures and are binding 
 
284 Sexual harassment was first defined by the Department of Defense in 1988 in Directive 
1350.2. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 1350.2, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM enc. 2 para. 10 (Dec. 23, 1988) [hereinafter DODD 1350.2] (on file 
with authors). The original directive stated: 
DEFINITIONS. . . . 
10. Sexual Harassment. A form of sex discrimination that involves 
unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: 
a. submission to or rejection of such conduct is made either 
explicitly implicitly a term or condition of a person's job, pay, or 
career, or 
b. submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as 
a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person, or 
c. such conduct interferes with an individual’s performance or 
creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. 
Any person in a supervisory or command position who uses or 
condones implicit or explicit sexual behavior to control, influence, or 
affect the career, pay, or job of a military member or civilian employee is 
engaging in sexual harassment. 
Similarly, any military member or civilian employee who makes 
deliberate or repeated unwelcomed verbal comments, gestures, or physical 
contact of a sexual nature is also engaging in sexual harassment. 
Id. This directive was revised in 1995 with the addition of language stating: 
[W]orkplace conduct, to be actionable as “abusive work environment” 
harassment, need not result in concrete psychological harm to the victim, 
but rather need only be so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person 
would perceive, and the victim does perceive, the work environment as 
hostile or offensive. (“Workplace” is an expansive term for Military 
members and may include conduct on or off duty, 24 hours a day.) 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 1350.2, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
(MEO) PROGRAM para. E2.1.15.3, at 18 (Aug. 18, 1995), https://www.esd.whs.mil/ 
Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/135002p.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS35-SNCH]. 
 In 2020, President Trump repealed DODD 1350.2, reissued it as an “Instruction,” 
and deleted the definition of sexual harassment from the issuance. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
INST. 1350.02, DOD MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www. 
esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/135002p.pdf?ver=2020-09-04-1241 
16-607 [https://perma.cc/KWX3-6XM4]. Presumably, this action will be reversed by 
President Biden.  
285 Department of Defense Instruction 1020.03, issued in 2018 and updated in 2020, contains 
the most current DOD definition of sexual harassment, as follows: 
GLOSSARY. . . . 
[S]exual harassment. Conduct that:  
Involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
deliberate or repeated offensive comments or gestures of a sexual nature 
when: 
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on the services.286 Notwithstanding federal court precedent holding that Title 
VII does not apply to Armed Service members,287 the definition of sexual 
harassment in these various equal opportunity policy documents is drawn 
almost directly from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
guidelines and Supreme Court cases interpreting Title VII.288 Commentators 
 
Submission to such conduct is, either explicitly or implicitly, 
made a term or condition of a person’s job, pay, or career[; or] 
Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as 
a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person; or 
Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creates an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 
Is so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person would perceive, and 
the victim does perceive, the environment as hostile or offensive. 
Any use or condonation, by any person in a supervisory or command 
position, of any form of sexual behavior to control, influence, or affect the 
career, pay, or job of a member of the Armed Forces or a civilian employee 
of the Department of Defense. 
Any deliberate or repeated unwelcome verbal comments or gesture of 
a sexual nature by any member of the Armed Forces or a civilian employee 
of the Department of Defense. 
There is no requirement for concrete psychological harm to the 
complainant for behavior to constitute sexual harassment. Behavior is 
sufficient to constitute sexual harassment if it is so severe or pervasive that 
a reasonable person would perceive, and the complainant does perceive, 
the environment as hostile or offensive. 
Sexual harassment can occur through electronic communications, 
including social media, other forms of communication, and in person. 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 1020.03, HARASSMENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE 
ARMED FORCES § G2 at 22 (Dec. 29, 2020) [hereinafter DODI 1020.03]. 
286 All of the services have implemented DODD 1350.2 and DODI 1020.03. See ARMY REG. 
600-20, supra note 232, ch. 7 (July 24, 2020); U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, POLICY DIRECTIVE 
(AFPD) 36-27 (Mar. 18, 2019); SEC’Y OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION (SECNAVINST) 
5300.26E (2020). 
287 See notes 174–176 and accompanying text. 
288 For example, the definition of sexual harassment in DODI 1020.03 is nearly identical to 
EEOC Guidance on what constitutes discrimination because of sex under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Compare DODI 1020.03, supra note 285, with Discrimination Because of Sex 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 (Nov. 10, 1980) 
(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2020)) (“Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
harassment . . . .”); see also United States v. Olivares, No. 201800125, 2019 WL 1076454, at 
*3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2019), (“Both the Department of Defense’s and the 
Department of the Navy’s definitions [of sexual harassment] are very similar to the definition 
promulgated in 1980 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission when it 
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have suggested that this policy-based definition contained in DODD’s and 
DODI’s could be used as the elements of a criminal sexual harassment 
offense for the Armed Forces.289 However, as this definition is derived from 
Title VII, which federal courts have held does not apply to service 
members,290 it is not clear how this language would be utilized to prosecute 
sexual harassment as a crime under the UCMJ. For example, will Title VII 
case law apply in UCMJ sexual harassment prosecutions?291 More broadly, 
 
determined that sexual harassment violated federal laws against sex discrimination . . . .”). 
Along the same lines, the “severe or pervasive” standard in DODI 1020.03 codifies a key 
holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that a hostile 
environment occurs “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult’ . . . that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” DODI 1020.03 is also 
derived from the holding of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), that the 
plaintiff need not present evidence of a nervous breakdown to prove a hostile work 
environment sexual harassment claim. So long as the conduct can “reasonably be perceived, 
and is perceived, as hostile and abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically 
injurious.” Id. at 22 (citation omitted). Note however that in contrast with Title VII, military 
policy construes “workplace” very broadly to include any place service members might live, 
work, train, and socialize together. See DODD 1350.2, supra note 284, at enc. 2 para. 10 
(“‘Workplace’ is an expansive term for Military members and may include conduct on or off 
duty, 24 hours a day.”); SAAITF REPORT, supra note 140, at 18 (recommending that a 
specific sexual harassment offense for the military should encompass misconduct that occurs 
outside the workplace too). 
289 See Hollywood, supra note 184, at 185 n.290 (proposing that the elements of sexual 
harassment be drawn from DODD 2020.03). Indeed, at least one military court took this 
approach in an Article 92 adjudication. See Olivares, 2019 WL 1076454, at *3 (using the 
definition of sexual harassment in DODD 1350.2 to determine the meaning of “sexual 
harassment” in Navy Regulation, Article 1166). 
290 See cases cited supra note 174. 
291 Although an extensive discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this Article, we 
will note that Title VII has already seeped into military law through the DOD’s incorporation 
of Supreme Court precedents and EEOC Guidelines into its directives and instructions 
proscribing sexual harassment, as well as through the services’ implementing regulations. 
See sources cited supra note 288 and accompanying text. Military courts have, in turn, relied 
on these policies and regulations to expand the scope of Article 92 of the UCMJ to cover 
sexually harassing conduct. See sources cited supra notes 238–239. Recently, an 
intermediate appellate military court even went so far as to directly reference EEOC sexual 
harassment Guidelines in concluding that a service member had received fair notice that his 
sexually harassing conduct could be subject to criminal sanctions under the UCMJ. See 
United States v. Da Silva, No. ACM 39599, 2020 WL 3468282, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
June 25, 2020). We are heartened by these developments, which commentators seem to have 
overlooked, for they suggest that Title VII already functions as a kind of shadow legal system 
inside the UCMJ. That is, the military justice system has increasingly come to resemble its 
civilian counterpart, notwithstanding federal courts’ judicial exclusion of service members 
from Title VII’s protections. This suggests that a promising route to bring the UCMJ into 
alignment with civil employment discrimination law may be through military policy, 
regulations, and case law rather than direct overhaul of the UCMJ by Congress, which is 
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will the many recent updates to Title VII be included in the criminal definition 
of sexual harassment?292 Although these questions may seem moot given that 
Title VII does not formally apply to armed service members, the fact remains 
that the DOD has already fashioned its EEO policies in a manner largely 
consistent with Title VII and relevant case law. These questions, therefore, 
cannot be avoided. Moreover, military case law on sexual harassment has 
involved other UCMJ articles, which have distinct elements.293 
Questions about the controlling case law in prosecutions under a punitive 
article for sexual harassment would surely arise if Congress were to criminalize 
sexual harassment directly through a stand-alone article in the UCMJ. Of course, 
Congress (and military courts applying and interpreting an updated penal 
code) could address these questions. Resolving them, although complicated, 
would not be insurmountable. However, to do so will require a deeper 
consideration of the relationship of the Armed Forces and the equality norms 
(established both in law and politics) of our larger democratic society. 
The proposal to criminalize sexual harassment directly in the UCMJ 
also raises significant procedural and practical issues. If the Department of 
Defense is to take the matter of preventing and remedying sexual harassment 
in the military seriously, it must reexamine its institutional design and 
allocation of authority. The dilemma is how to do that in a fair and just 
manner that strikes a balance between the military’s unique mission, 
organizational structure, and rules, on the one hand, and the protection of 
service members’ right to be free of sex (and sexuality) discrimination, on 
 
always a politically fraught exercise. More broadly, one cannot but acknowledge that, like all 
plural legal systems, the United States’ civilian legal system and military justice system are not 
independent; they are “part of the same system in [a] particular social context and are . . . 
intertwined in the same micro-social processes.” Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. 
& SOC’Y REV. 869, 873 (1988) (paraphrasing remarks delivered by Francis Snyder at the 
Bellagio Conference on People’s Law and State Law, 1981). 
292 For example, the Supreme Court has held that Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination includes same-sex sexual harassment, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998), as well as harassment on the basis of an individual’s homosexual 
or transgender status. Bostock v. Clayton Co., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). Moreover, under 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting Title VII, civilian employers are not vicariously liable 
for sexual harassment if they can establish that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the 
acts or that they promptly corrected the conduct after it became evident. See Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 778, 807–08 (1998). This defense has been subject to severe criticism by victims’ 
advocates for failing to account for the ways that power, identity, and institutional contexts 
cause victims not to report. See sources cited supra note 22 and accompanying text. If 
Congress codifies a legal standard for sexual harassment in the UCMJ, it will need to decide 
whether this expansive defense is relevant in a setting where severe power inequalities are 
inherent in the institutional design and formal policies of the workplace. Of course, Congress 
could leave these questions for military courts to decide, and perhaps that is the most 
politically feasible outcome, but that would be a lost opportunity.  
293 See Hollywood, supra note 184, at 185. 
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the other. DOD and Congress will also need to consider the practical effect 
of employing a criminal burden of proof to address sexual harassment. That 
is, will the proposed legal mechanism of direct criminalization (and, 
potentially, court-martialing service members for sexual harassment) even 
work to deter and remedy sexual misconduct? We turn to this second set of 
questions here. 
The latest feminist thinking about legal responses to sexual violence 
centers around the idea that more collaborative, less adversarial legal models 
are preferred.294 This idea has developed out of distinct but converging 
critiques, including feminist reflections on the failures of criminal legal 
responses to sexual violence, discomfort with certain aspects of the #MeToo 
movement, and the effects of America’s ever-expanding criminal justice 
system on people of color. Many feminists have lauded the increased public 
attention to sexual harassment and gender violence that the #MeToo movement 
has generated, yet others “have pushed back against the demands for a bigger 
and better criminal response.”295 The objections to the use (and overuse) of 
criminal law and new forms of regulation to address sexual violence and 
harassment exist on a number of levels and emerge from distinct concerns. 
Some feminists argue that feminist antiviolence work has contributed 
to the build-up of policing and mass incarceration in our country.296 They 
 
294 See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, The Restorative Workplace: An Organizational 
Learning Approach to Discrimination, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 487 passim (2016) (drawing on 
organizational management, conflict resolution theory, and antidiscrimination law to argue 
that restorative justice practices may better advance the goals of antidiscrimination law than 
the adversarial legal system); Goldscheid, supra note 23 (exploring the use of non-
adversarial approaches to address sexual harassment in the workplace); Laurie S. Kohn, 
#MeToo, Wrongs Against Women, and Restorative Justice, 28 KANS. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 561, 
576–85 (2019) (advocating restorative justice for workplace sexual harassment and assault).  
295 Brenda Cossman, #MeToo, Sex Wars 2.0 and the Power of Law, in 3 ASIAN Y.B. HUM. RTS. 
& HUMANITARIAN L. 18, 20 (Javaid Rehman, Ayesha Shahid & Steve Foster eds., 2019). 
296 See, e.g., MARIA BEVACQUA, RAPE ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA: FEMINISM AND THE POLITICS 
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 111–51 (2000) (telling the story of how feminists were successful in 
mainstreaming their concerns about rape, but their success was largely achieved through 
appeal to law-and-order politics scapegoating and criminalizing men of color); GOODMARK, 
DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 23, passim (arguing that domestic 
violence has been overcriminalized to the detriment of victims and society and urging that 
we use legal and criminal justice responses as a last resort within much more holistic, 
therapeutic, resource-based approach to IPV); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE 
GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 115–39 (2006) (detailing 
the “long and conflicted history” of women’s groups and feminists on issues related to crime 
and their role in uncritically pushing for increased policing); AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST 
WAR ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS 
INCARCERATION passim (2020) (analyzing ways in which the feminist movements’ work to 
protect women from rape and domestic violence has contributed to mass incarceration); 
Mimi Kim, Dancing the Carceral Creep: The Anti-Domestic Violence Movement and the 
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point out that people of color, especially of low socioeconomic status, have 
been disproportionately impacted by the fervor to criminalize domestic 
violence, for example, including female victims, the very people antiviolence 
advocates aim to emancipate.297 Others “t[ake] issue with” the “negative 
stance” on “sex and sexuality” implicit in much antiviolence work.298 Some 
critics, including those who identify as feminists, argue that the definitions of 
sexual harassment governing the workplace, universities, and other major 
societal institutions are too broad, potentially capturing consensual sexual 
behavior.299 Finally, feminists working in the antiviolence movement have 
come to see the ineffectiveness of punitive approaches and adversarial legal 
processes for addressing sexual violence. That is, advocates now understand 
that despite the massive body of law and regulatory infrastructures now in 
place to address sexual assault, violence, and harassment in homes, 
workplaces, schools, and on college campuses, the system does not prevent 
violence or protect survivors when it occurs.300  
 
Paradoxical Pursuit of Criminalization, 1973–1986, at 2 (Inst. Study Soc. Issues, Working Paper 
No. 2013-2014.70, 2015), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/804227k6 [https://perma.cc/6L9N-
J6QK] (“[A]ttempts to feminize the state led to the unwitting support for policies of mass 
incarceration, thereby reproducing and re-enforcing hierarchies of gender, race, class and 
sexuality . . . .”); cf. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 35–54 (2009) (asserting that a number of 
worrisome trends have occurred in the wake of the “domestic violence revolution,” including 
that criminal law now imposes “de facto divorce” through its enforcement of easily 
obtainable protection orders). 
297 See BETH RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S 
PRISON NATION 99–124 (2012) (exploring the rise of the punishment industry in the United 
States and the consequent mass incarceration of poor women and women of color who break 
laws to survive abusive relationships); Goodmark, Stop Treating Domestic Violence 
Differently, supra note 23 (“Encouraging a larger role for law enforcement also had the 
unintended consequence of punishing victims.”). 
298 See Cossman, supra note 295, at 20; Wendy Brown, Finding the Man in the State, 18 
FEMINIST STUD. 7, 9 (1992) (critiquing the “politics of protection” that “construct[] [the] 
divide between light and dark, wives and prostitutes, good girls and bad ones”); Jacob Gersen 
& Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 882 (2016) (discussing “the 
bureaucratic tendency to merge sexual violence and sexual harassment with ordinary sex, and 
thus to trivialize a very serious problem”); cf. SUK, supra note 296, at 106–31 (arguing that 
privacy law has been reimagined in the form of a vulnerable woman, with consequences that both 
reinforce harmful gender roles and increase state control of intimate relationships in the home). 
299 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003); cf. 
Jeannie Suk Gersen, Nancy Gertner & Janet Halley, Comment Letter on Proposed Title IX 
Rulemaking, at 14 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018-
OCR-0064-11950 [https://perma.cc/7LDC-CEKP] (arguing that President Trump’s 
proposed Title IX Rule adopted a definition of sexual harassment that was both too narrow 
and too broad). 
300 Some are therefore turning to other models to address sexual violence, such as restorative 
justice. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 23. Traditionally, restorative justice is an approach 
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We focus here primarily on the last insight, as it is the most applicable 
in the military context. It is not clear that punishing sexual harassment as a 
crime under the UCMJ will deter sexual harassment. Sexual assault has 
already been punishable as a punitive offense under UCMJ Article 120 for 
decades, and as recent statistics show, this has not led to a significant 
reduction of incidents.301 The same could likely be expected even if sexual 
harassment receives its own punitive article.302 Some commentators have 
noted that military unit commanders are under pressure to deal with sexual 
offenses assertively, which has translated into seeking more severe judicial 
punishment rather than nonjudicial punishment.303 While the optics of 
seeking stiff penalties for sexual offenses are intended to show that the 
military is taking the problem seriously, these charges face a higher burden 
of proof than the same behavior would face when disciplined with nonjudicial 
penalties.304 Therefore, cases that could reliably be punished by nonjudicial 
means are likely to go unpunished after an unsuccessful attempt to prosecute 
as a punitive judicial offense.305 This hypothesis is confirmed by a recent 
study of sexual assault prosecutions in the military, which found that one 
reason for the military’s low conviction rate for sex crimes is the high burden 
of proof for obtaining a court-martial.306 
 
to justice in which one of the responses to a crime is to organize a meeting between the victim 
and the offender, sometimes with representatives of the wider community. Today, the term’s 
use in many contexts has rendered its meaning somewhat blurred. However, some of its defining 
features include resolution of disputes outside of courts (to facilitate truth telling), meaningful 
accountability, efforts to disrupt (rather than punish) sexual misconduct, and nonjudgmental 
measures that encourage reflection and acceptance of responsibility. Goldscheid, supra note 23, 
manuscript at 15–19 (defining restorative justice). The modern usage of the term “restorative 
justice” can be traced to Albert Eglash. DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS 
STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 21–22 (5th ed. 
2015). Albert Eglash was a psychologist in the 1950s working with incarcerated people. He 
saw the need for his clients to be accountable for their behavior that hurt others and saw its 
rehabilitation value. He first presented this idea in a 1975 restitution conference paper titled 
Beyond Restitution–Creative Restitution, which was subsequently published in RESTITUTION 
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway 
eds., 1977). 
301 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
302 Indeed, prosecutions of sexually harassing conduct under UCMJ Articles 92, 93, and 134 
does not seem to have had any impact. See discussion supra Section II.C.2. 
303 See Seth Michael Engel, Fostering a Safe Warfighting Environment: Applying Title IX 
and Student Discipline in Higher Education to the Military’s Fight Against Sexual Assault, 
32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 133, 136 (2017).  
304 Id. 
305 See id. at 160 (arguing that overreliance on court-martial results in failure to punish 
perpetrators of sexual assault because of the higher burden of proof in court-martial). 
306 See Warner & Armstrong, supra note 146, at 294–95. While such constitutional due 
process concerns justify a high evidentiary standard for criminal convictions, they are out of 
place when the alleged offense is sexual harassment that does not involve criminal conduct. 
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Even more problematic, given the unique institutional and cultural 
obstacles to reporting sexual misconduct in the military―including the 
imperative of unit cohesion, the expected self-sacrifice of the “leave no man 
behind” credo, and the chain of command cage307―raising the stakes for 
sexual harassment will likely backfire, resulting in even fewer victims 
reporting harassment within the military’s existing disciplinary system.  
In sum, there is no doubt that adding a dedicated punitive article for 
sexual harassment to the UCMJ would clarify for all branches what conduct 
constitutes a criminal sexual harassment offense. This could benefit both 
victims and alleged perpetrators, creating a uniform, transparent standard for 
guiding behavior and reducing the potential for both under- and over-
regulation. A penal article on sexual harassment would also have 
expressional value, signaling to all that sexual harassment is impermissible 
conduct. However, there are significant downsides to this proposal if 
implemented in isolation. Not only may it backfire by raising the stakes for 
the involved service members, thereby deterring reporting, but criminalizing 
sexual harassment is an inappropriate response to conduct that in any other 
setting would be treated as a civil wrong. To be successful, a UCMJ criminal 
article on sexual harassment must be paired with other reforms to the UCMJ 
that will bring the military justice system into closer alignment with Title VII, 
which we discuss in Part III. 
 
III. ALIGNING THE UCMJ WITH TITLE VII 
 
 This Part turns to solutions. Here, we outline an updated regulatory 
framework for the UCMJ that would bring the military’s legal response to 
sexual harassment in alignment with civil employment discrimination law. 
The first proposal is procedural. It seeks to ensure that sexual harassment 
victims in the military have the same right to an independent investigation 
and adjudication of their complaints as civilian employees. The second 
proposal seeks to ensure that the evidentiary standard used to evaluate sexual 
harassment complaints under the UCMJ is the preponderance of the evidence 
standard; this can be achieved by relying on existing UCMJ administrative 
actions. The third proposal seeks to ensure the service members can obtain 
compensatory damages for economic and psychological injuries caused by 
sexual harassment. We note that none of these reforms necessitates extending 






307 See discussion supra Section II.B.1. 
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A. Process: The Right to an Independent Adjudication 
 
When the military receives a report that a service member engaged in 
sexually harassing conduct so frequent or severe that it creates a hostile or 
offensive work environment,308 responsibility for investigating and punishing 
the conduct should be taken out of the chain of command. That is, military 
victims of sexual harassment should receive the same protections as civilian 
victims to an independent investigation, a written record, and independent 
finder of fact and decisionmaker, as well as standardized procedures, 
definitions, and recommended penalties for perpetrators. 
 We note here that our proposal represents an expanded version of the 
Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA), first introduced by Senator Kirsten 
Gillibrand in 2013.309 The MJIA would take charging discretion away from 
unit commanders for sexual assaults and some other felony offenses and put it 
in the hands of outside military attorneys.310 The stated objective of the MJIA 
is to “professionalize how the military prosecutes serious crimes by moving 
the decision over whether to prosecute them to independent, trained, 
professional military prosecutors.”311 Senator Gillibrand, along with bipartisan 
cosponsors, announced that the MJIA would be introduced as an amendment 
to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.312 
 The MJIA is a step in the right direction, and we support its core 
reform directing independent prosecution of sexual assault. However, it 
should be expanded to include sexual harassment under certain 
 
308 Or other conduct that would meet the definition of sexual harassment as defined in a new 
UCMJ article on sexual harassment, including, presumably quid pro quo sexual harassment. 
309 The MJIA has been consistently reintroduced into Congress since 2013. S. 967, 113th 
Cong. (2013); S. 2992, 113th Cong. (2014); S. Amend. 1578, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 2141, 
115th Cong. (2017); S. 1789, 116th Cong. (2019). 
310 Rustico, supra note 183, at 2061. While the MJIA and its core reform was not signed into 
law, it generated a great deal of discussion and has influenced several substantial reforms to 
the UCMJ’s treatment of sexual assault. One such change is that, now, any “matters that 
relate to the character of a victim” are barred from consideration when making disposition 
decisions. See id. at 2040–46, 2061. Nor is the good military character of the accused given 
consideration in sexual assault cases, removing the so-called “good soldier defense.” Id. at 
2043. Retaliation against service members reporting a criminal offense is also strictly 
prohibited. Id. at 2061 (citing National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. 
L. No. 113-66, § 1709, 127 Stat. 672, 960–61 (2013)). 
311 Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley, Gillibrand, Cruz Offer Bipartisan Military 
Justice Improvement Act Amendment to Defense Bill (July 2, 2020), https://www.grassley. 
senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-gillibrand-cruz-offer-bipartisan-military-justice-im 
provement-act [https://perma.cc/75QD-KSC8].  
312 Id.; see also Press Release, Sen. Ted Cruz, Sens. Cruz, Gillibrand Reintroduce Military Justice 
Improvement Act (June 13, 2019), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=4527 
[https://perma.cc/9HTL-W5VR] (noting that Republican co-sponsors included Senators Ted 
Cruz, Chuck Grassley, Lisa Murkowski, and Rand Paul). 
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circumstances, which we describe below. That is, the MJIA does not go far 
enough, for it leaves discipline for sexual harassment within the chain of 
command when all evidence suggests that sexual harassment is as persistent a 
problem in the military as sexual assault313 and when even the military’s own 
studies find a strong correlation between sexual harassment and assault.314 
 Removing investigatory, charging, and disciplinary discretion for 
both sexual assault and harassment outside of the chain of command would 
be a significant change to the UCMJ, because unit commanders have 
something akin to prosecutorial discretion within their units.315 Limiting a 
commander’s discretion to discipline certain offenses is antithetical to 
military thinking, and the Department of Defense has remained opposed to 
the MJIA.316 Opponents have argued against such a change, believing it 
would degrade commanders’ ability to maintain order and discipline.317 The 
MJIA, in contrast, is concerned with obtaining just outcomes for sexual 
assault victims by reducing the risk of biased decision-making by interested 
unit commanders and encouraging victims to report complaints without fear 
of retaliation.318 
 Our proposal―which would remove a commander’s discretion to 
handle sexually harassing conduct so frequent or severe that it creates a 
hostile or offensive work environment―represents an intermediate-level 
intervention that fairly balances the military’s interests in preserving the 
chain of command with justice for service members who suffer the harms of 
sexual misconduct.319 In suggesting that the UCMJ be modified in this way, 
 
313 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
314 See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 11 
(“[U]nhealthy climates marked by sexual harassment, gender discrimination, workplace 
hostility, lack of unit cohesion, and lack of personal responsibility incrementally increase the 
risk of experiencing a sexual assault.”); SAAITF Report, supra note 140, at 18 (“Based on 
surveys conducted by the Department, there is a strong positive correlation between the 
occurrence of sexual harassment within military units and the occurrence of sexual assault. 
Commands and installations with greater occurrence of sexual harassment often have higher 
rates of sexual assault.”). 
315 See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.  
316 ROLE OF THE COMMANDER SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 192, at 2 (primarily 
arguing that there was no strong evidence to suggest that removing charging discretion would 
be effective in addressing sexual assault). 
317 Id. at 102 (citing statements of a high-ranking Airforce General who believed that giving 
commanders “responsibility without authority” would degrade the trust that they must be fair 
and impartial, ultimately weakening the system and reducing military effectiveness). 
318 Such fears are well founded. See sources cited supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.  
319 Of note, in 2020, Representatives Jackie Spier and Markwayne Mullin introduced a bill 
in the House of Representatives containing a similar proposal. See I am Vanessa Guillén Act 
of 2020, H.R. 8270, 116th Cong. (2020). The Act would require each military department to 
establish an Office of the Chief Prosecutor and transfer charging decisions for sex-related 
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we acknowledge that isolated incidents of sexual harassment may escape 
redress. Where the conduct does not rise to the level of severe sexual 
misconduct, offenders may have “one bite of the apple,” so to speak, without 
the incident being removed from the chain of command. However difficult 
the choice to reform the UCMJ in this way, we suggest that the military’s 
legitimate interests in preserving the chain of command should permit a 
commander to address isolated complaints of sexual harassment “in-house.” 
This authority should be removed as soon as one or more reports suggest that 
a service member has engaged in serial acts of sexual harassment or severe 
sexual misconduct. This approach would align the UCMJ with civil sexual 
harassment law, which defines hostile work environment sexual harassment 
as unwelcome conduct, because of sex, that is severe or pervasive enough to 
create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider 
intimidating, hostile, or abusive.320 
 This proposal is not a far stretch from existing military law. There are 
already some mechanisms in place enabling the centralized human resources 
component of a military branch to initiate involuntary administrative 
separations of service members outside of a unit commander’s discretion.321 
Such separations can be initiated based on a service member’s official records 
of misconduct, sometimes referred to as “bad paper.”322 The DOD is already 
cataloging incidents of sexual assault and harassment in the CATCH 
program. Therefore, it is not a giant leap to empower independent military 
 
offenses, including sexual harassment and sexual assault, from the commander to the 
service’s chief prosecutor. Id.; see also Alex Horton, Proposed Vanessa Guillén Law Would 
Transform Military’s Sexual Misconduct Inquiries, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2020, 3:04 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/09/16/proposed-vanessa-guilln-
law-would-transform-militarys-sexual-misconduct-inquiries/ [https://perma.cc/LLK3-S445] 
(reporting that Vanessa Guillén was murdered the day before she was planning to file a 
harassment complaint against her harasser). 
320 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 67 (1986); Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
harassment [https://perma.cc/S2DY-6ASC] (last visited Dec. 18, 2020). 
321 See Administrative Separation / Boards of Inquiry, LAW OFFICE OF JOCELYN C. STEWARD, 
https://www.ucmj-defender.com/practice-areas/administrative-separation-boards/ [https://perma. 
cc/3WGA-VEVG] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). This primer discusses Army Human Resources 
Command (HRC) initiating administrative separation boards for enlisted service members 
and Boards of Inquiry for officers to decide whether a service member should be permitted 
to stay in service based on nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 or letters of reprimand 
(GOMORS). Id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 135-175 §§ 2-13 at 14–15, 2-17 at 16, 
2-19 at 16–17 (Mar. 30, 2020); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, NAVY MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL 
(MILPERSMAN) 1910-010, 1910-100, 1920-010, https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/ 
reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZW73-
4L2Z] (last visited Nov. 5th, 2020) (discussing Navy human resources enlisted and officer 
involuntary separation).  
322 Id.  
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investigators, prosecutors, or centralized human resources offices to use this 
information to investigate and discipline sexual harassment.323  
Our proposal to reform the UCMJ and CATCH program to better 
align with civil employment discrimination law raises a question: Why does 
Title VII not apply to the military in the first place? Indeed, other experts 
on discrimination in the military have proposed extending Title VII to cover 
all military personnel.324 While the military is a workplace as much as any 
other, it is also a unique institution justifying an independent legal system. 
Practical considerations also make extending Title VII to the military 
 
323 Another question, which we will leave for another day, is whether a disciplinary response 
for severe or pervasive sexual harassment should be mandatory or whether a confidential 
reporting process for sexual harassment should be integrated into the military’s existing 
CATCH program. This is a difficult question and there are persuasive arguments on both sides. 
  As discussed, supra, the CATCH system permits the military to sit on information 
demonstrating serious crimes, repeat offenses, and systemic sex discrimination if a victim 
does not file an unrestricted report. This system irrationally relieves the military of 
responsibility for serious or repeat sexual misconduct even if it knows of the conduct. This 
may be justifiable in the criminal context in light of notions of prosecutorial discretion. 
However, in the civilian employment context, the idea that an employer could systematically 
collect information about sexual harassment without taking any responsive action and avoid 
Title VII liability is inconceivable by any civil standard. 
 On the other hand, as we discuss, supra, the option of anonymous reporting for 
sexual harassment (as with sexual assault) could contribute to increased reporting, given that 
retaliation for reporting sexual misconduct is rampant in the military. See sources cited supra 
notes 147–149 and accompanying text. Creating a confidential reporting process for sexual 
harassment that is integrated with the existing CATCH program would also obviate the need 
for victims to assess whether the sexual misconduct they experienced fits neatly into 
particular categories, and it might normalize a culture of reporting sexual misconduct in the 
military. Finally, because military surveys find a strong correlation between sexual 
harassment and assault in the military, see discussion supra note 314, extending CATCH to 
sexual harassment would strengthen the military’s ability to address sexual assault by helping 
to identifying service members who often engage in both types of sexual misconduct. 
 These competing arguments track feminist debates about how best to address sexual 
violence in the civilian context. There are no easy answers. Given the benefits of CATCH in 
the current military climate, it may be too soon to recommend that sexual harassment victims 
be forced to report publicly. However, as an aspirational matter, that is the direction we hope 
the current reforms are heading. It is our hope that, as a first step, by taking investigations 
and disciplinary responses for sexual harassment out of the chain of command (along with 
sexual assault), at least where a victim voluntarily wishes to make an unrestricted report, a 
significant change in culture will result. Victims would feel comfortable reporting sexual 
misconduct without fear of retaliation by commanders and peers. In turn, the military would 
be obligated to take responsive action when those reports come to light. While it is likely 
premature, we think this would ultimately be best.  
324 See Michael I. Spak & Alice M. McCart, Effect of Military Culture on Responding to 
Sexual Harassment: The Warrior Mystique, 83 NEB. L. REV. 79, 99 (2004) (citing Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)); see also Hollywood, supra note 184, at 194–95; 
Westergard, supra note 40, at 232. 
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unlikely.325 Reforming the UCMJ in the manner suggested here, on the other 
hand, would respect the unique nature and interests of the military, because 
military investigators and prosecutors would have jurisdiction over sexual 
harassment cases rather than civilian courts. This approach would bring the 
civilian and military justice systems closer together, modernizing the UCMJ 
while respecting the military’s jurisdictional independence.  
 
B. Evidence: Using Administrative Actions and a Civil Burden of Proof 
 
Congress and the military are aware that there is a problem with 
sexual harassment in the Armed Forces, but the prohibition against suits for 
torts or Title VII workplace discrimination326 means that criminal courts-
martial have become the preferred method to demonstrate that the military is 
taking sexual misconduct seriously.327 This is reflected in the military’s 
treatment of sexual assault, where there has been a push to pursue courts-
martial rather than administrative remedies.328 
The UCMJ is a criminal code by definition, so it is understandable 
that the military has chosen to view sexual harassment through the lens of 
criminal law rather than focus on its discriminatory harms.329 However, as a 
civil legal concept, sexual harassment is broader than sexual assault; it 
includes attempting to make work conditions contingent on sexual favors, 
unwanted sexual attention, and harassing conduct that disparages a person 
because of sex.330 Punishing sexual harassment as a crime would no doubt 
 
325 As previously noted, there is a long line of Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions holding 
that Title VII does not apply to uniformed personnel. See cases cited supra note 174. Given 
that the Supreme Court does not seem poised to reverse this precedent, it would likely require 
an act of Congress to bring uniformed service members under Title VII’s protection. It is 
difficult to envision Congress enacting such a significant change to the Armed Forces in our 
present hyper-partisan political climate.  
326 See supra Section II.B.2.  
327 See Chema, supra note 224, at 6–7 (stating that service members’ lack of remedy for 
sexual harassment under Title VII, as well as the Feres doctrine’s prohibition on common-
law torts, increases emphasis on criminalization of sexual harassment). 
328 See generally Engel, supra note 303, at 135 (arguing that 1) public and media anger about 
the military’s light treatment of sexual assault through administrative remedies has led to a 
push to criminally prosecute sexual assault, which results in more acquittals due to the higher 
burden of proof and difficulty meeting that burden with the typical evidence, and that 2) 
focusing only on the criminal aspect of sexual assault fails to address the discriminatory 
harms caused by sexual assault, and thus does not effectively deter sexual assault).  
329 Id.  
330 See Sarah L. Cook, Lilla M. Cortina & Mary P. Koss, What’s the Difference Between 
Sexual Abuse, Sexual Assault, Sexual Harassment and Rape?, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 
20, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://theconversation.com/whats-the-difference-between-sexual-
abuse-sexual-assault-sexual-harassment-and-rape-88218 [https://perma.cc/D6B3-VG9V]; 
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convey a level of seriousness, but it would be a blunt, inaccurate tool in 
addressing discrimination.331 Moreover, criminalization is indicative of the 
military continuing to view sexual misconduct as a problem of finite bad 
actors rather than as a systemic, institutional problem facilitated by the 
military’s culture and organizational composition. 
To be sure, the military holds service members to a higher standard 
of conduct than civilians. Thus, the UCMJ criminalizes some conduct that 
would not otherwise be a crime in the civilian sphere.332 However, military 
prosecutors would likely find it difficult to prove cases beyond a reasonable 
doubt in a court-martial when sexual harassment cases are often based solely 
on the testimony of the victim and accused.333 
We acknowledge that using administrative action to address sexual 
misconduct has been criticized as light treatment—a slap on the wrist, so to 
speak.334 This is certainly true in some cases, where unit commanders use less 
severe administrative actions like oral or written counseling to address 
substantiated cases of sexual assault.335 However, there is a spectrum of 
administrative actions, including more serious forms such as a General 
Officer Order of Reprimand (GOMOR).336 It is these more serious UCMJ 
administrative actions that we suggest using to address sexual harassment. 
Importantly, as an administrative action, GOMORs use a non-criminal 
evidentiary standard (the preponderance of the evidence) that is more 
 
see also supra note 320 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs have attempted to address sexual 
harassment through tort law, for instance, by bringing claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (IIED), but IIED encompasses actions outside of conduct constituting 
sexual harassment. See Joanna Stromberg, Comment, Sexual Harassment: Discrimination 
or Tort?, 12 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 317, 337–39 (2003). 
331 See Westergard, supra note 40, at 230–31 (“Because the UCMJ was designed to 
approximate the criminal law rather than employment law, it is ill-equipped to resolve 
disputes over adverse employment actions.”). 
332 See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1150 n.2 (noting that adultery, for example, is punishable 
as a criminal offense under UCMJ Article 134). 
333 This assertion is based on the fact that we see a similar issue with sexual assault 
allegations. There is often insufficient evidence to prosecute assault cases because military 
prosecutors are evaluating evidence for a court-martial under a criminal burden of proof. See 
e.g., DOD FY 2019 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, APP. B, supra note 146, at 17 tbl.4, 27 
fig.15 (reporting that, of the 3,716 sexual assault case dispositions considered for possible 
action by DOD commanders in the fiscal year 2019, only 50 or 1% were determined to be 
unfounded after legal review, yet 710 or 19% of the cases only provided probable cause to 
prosecute a non-sexual assault offense, and 1,022 or 28% had insufficient evidence to 
prosecute any offense).  
334 For example, The Invisible War (Chain Camera Pictures 2012), a documentary film 
chronicling the issue of sexual assault in the military, focused on light treatment of 
perpetrators with administrative actions such as informal or written counseling.  
335 To be clear, we do not support administrative action for substantiated instances of rape or 
sexual assault. 
336 See ARMY REG. 600-37, supra note 199, para. 3-4, at 4–5. 
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appropriate for sexual harassment offenses than a criminal burden of proof.337 
A GOMOR is where a General Officer (an officer with the rank of General) 
issues a reprimand or directs a reprimand issued by a subordinate to be filed 
permanently in a service member’s Official Military Personnel File 
(OMPF).338 While a “reprimand” might sound innocuous to those outside the 
military, GOMORs are widely understood and accepted to be a “kiss-of-
death” for a service member’s career, especially if they are made a permanent 
part of a service member’s personnel file.339 Receiving this sort of reprimand 
will, at the very least, stop the career progression of a service member because 
of the stain left on their record.340 A GOMOR can also trigger an 
administrative separation.341 A discharge based on a GOMOR can be 
 
337 The Air Force requires a preponderance of evidence to evaluate conduct supporting a 
punitive letter of reprimand. See U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 36-2907, UNFAVORABLE 
INFORMATION FILE (UIF) PROGRAM para. 4.1.3. (Nov. 26, 2014). The Navy and Marine 
Corps limit use of punitive letters of reprimand to punishment imposed by court-martial or 
nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, but a preponderance of evidence standard is used 
for Article 15 actions in the Navy. See U.S. Dep’t of Navy, Navy Admin. Message No. 
189/14, Inclusion and Command Review of Information on Sex-related Offenses in 
Personnel Service Records para. 7 (Aug 14, 2014), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents2/NAV2014/NAV14189.txt [https://perma.cc/W7W7-
UYNN] (noting that, in the Navy, a punitive letter of reprimand cannot be filed in a service 
member’s personnel file pursuant to a non-punitive administrative action); MANUAL OF THE 
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL (JAGMAN) § 0110 (2012) (stating that, in the Navy, a 
preponderance of the evidence standard is used for nonjudicial punishment under Article 15). 
The Army uses a preponderance standard for administrative investigations, which would be 
the fact-finding context for sexual harassment allegations forming the basis of a punitive 
letter of reprimand. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 15-6, PROCEDURES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
INVESTIGATIONS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS para. 3-10.b., at 24 (Apr. 1, 2016). 
338 See sources supra notes 195–207 and accompanying text; see also 7TH ARMY TRAINING 
COMMAND, U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, LEGAL ASSISTANCE INFORMATION PAPER: LETTERS OF 
REPRIMAND AND GENERAL OFFICER MEMORANDUMS OF REPRIMAND [hereinafter ARMY 
INFORMATION PAPER ON GOMARS], https://www.7atc.army.mil/Portals/17/Documents/SJA/ 
GOMORandLORwithTemplate.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX7J-M4EC] (last visited Dec. 10, 2020).  
339 See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1170 n.98 (providing numerous examples of GOMORs 
having serious negative consequences on career progression in the military). 
340 See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1170; ARMY INFORMATION PAPER ON GOMARS, supra 
note 338, at 2 (“Receiving a GOMOR may prevent you from being promoted.”). 
341 See, e.g., Caez v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding 
involuntary separation of an Army Guard reserve officer after he received a GOMOR for 
adultery, conduct unbecoming of an officer, and drug use); ARMY INFORMATION PAPER ON 
GOMARS, supra note 338, at 2 (stating that receiving a GOMOR may trigger a review 
leading to denial of continued service). Given the interests at stake, service members facing 
administrative separations have due process rights, including the right to notice, present 
evidence, cross examine witnesses, and appeal; however, commentators have argued that in 
practice the process afforded is minimal. See Major Brian D. Andes, The End Does Not 
Justify the Means: Why Diminished Due Process During Reductions in Force is Unjust, 225 
MIL. L. REV. 84, 101–03 (2017) (discussing procedures and due process rights for officers 
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classified as “other than honorable,” a red flag for civilian employers.342 As 
it currently stands, while independent human resources components may 
initiate proceedings to remove a service member on the basis of a 
GOMOR,343 the unit commander of the offending service member remains 
the person with discretion under the UCMJ to take the initial administrative 
action.344 Congress could amend the UCMJ to change this for sexual 
harassment, giving discretion and authority to initiate administrative action 
to centralized human resources components of the branches or a review board 
specifically designed to address sexual misconduct. The goal and effect 
would be to create a non-criminal mechanism to address sexual harassment 
outside of the chain of command.  
Aggressive use of GOMORs has shown to be effective at stimulating 
cultural shifts in the military, as exemplified by the case of driving under the 
influence (DUI).345 Starting in the 1980s, the military sought to address high 
rates of alcohol related offenses like DUI by issuing regulations directing that 
GOMORs be given to service members who had been found driving with 
blood alcohol content over the legal limit.346 Given the serious ramifications 
of GOMORs, the DOD and branch secretaries elevated DUI to a career-
ending offense in many cases.347 Today, due to these policy and enforcement 
 
facing administrative separations); Bojan, supra note 198, at 1152 (“Arguably, GOMORs . . . 
have become de facto punishment not subject to the extensive due process protections of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).”).  
342 See Meghna Chakrabarti, Life After an Other-Than-Honorable Discharge, NPR (Dec. 12, 
2013, 1:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/250543667 [https://perma.cc/Y93A-HPSH] 
(detailing a conversation with former service members about how an Other than Honorable 
Discharge negatively affected their civilian lives); see also VETERANS HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., OTHER THAN HONORABLE DISCHARGES: 
IMPACT ON ELIGIBILITY FOR VA HEALTH CARE BENEFITS, IB 10-448 (2017), https:// 
www.va.gov/healthbenefits/resources/publications/IB10-448_other_than_honorable_discharges 
5_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ57-JPQ6] (describing how an Other than Honorable Discharge 
characterization can negatively affect VA benefits). 
343 See sources cited supra note 321. 
344 See MCM, supra note 184, at II-28 (R.C.M. 306(c)(2)). 
345 Stephen Gerras & Col. Charles Allen, Strategic Leadership and Organizational Culture, 
in STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: THE GENERAL’S ART 177, 189 (Mark Grandstaff & Georgia 
Sorensen eds., 2008). 
346 See id. at 190 (recalling that officers would get GOMORs if they were caught driving 
drunk, “significantly reduc[ing] their chances of subsequent promotion); see also U.S. DEP’T 
OF ARMY, REG. 190-5, MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC SUPERVISION para. 2-7, at 7 (May 22, 2006) 
(providing a joint regulation shared between all branches of the military, alternatively titled 
OPNAV 1120.5D, AFI 31-218(I), MCO 5110.1D, and DLAR 5720.1). 
347 See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1170, 1195 (stating that GOMORs, which are generally 
perceived as career killers in the military, are automatically given to service members who 
receive a DUI); see also USAG Stuttgart Law Center, How a DUI Forever Changed a Local 
Soldier’s Career, ARMY.MIL (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.army.mil/article/165772/how_a_ 
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reforms, DUI is arguably taken far more seriously in the military than in many 
civilian workplaces.348 As a result of the use of GOMORs in this context, in 
today’s military, it is simply understood that DUI will impact a military 
career. As a consequence, there is far less cultural acceptance of driving under 
the influence of alcohol.349  
If DOD leadership were to issue directives instructing GOMORs to 
be filed in cases where a preponderance of the evidence supported a finding 
of sexual harassment, it could create the same sort of cultural shift that was 
achieved with DUI. While some have expressed concern about due process 
when using GOMORs, given their serious career ramifications,350 the simple 
fact is that criminal burdens of proof are not well-suited to address sexual 
harassment allegations. Moreover, the use of this punitive administrative 
action would only result after an investigation into the alleged sexual 
harassment, with the alleged perpetrator having an opportunity to respond 
before a GOMOR is filed in their record.351 Additionally, even though they 
are classified as administrative actions, GOMORs have a stigma attached to 
them that is difficult to convey to those outside the military; they are 
considered far more serious than nonjudicial punishment under Article 15.352 
 
dui_forever_changed_a_local_soldiers_career [https://perma.cc/4FMJ-LCWU] (discussing 
the long-term negative consequences on a soldier’s career after having received a DUI and a 
general officer letter of reprimand).  
348 This assertion is primarily based on co-author Sagen Gearhart’s experience as an Officer in 
the U.S. Army. While a DUI might have may or may not have some impact on an individual’s 
civilian job, it absolutely will affect a military career. 
349 See Gerras & Allen, supra note 345, at 190 (noting that allocation of rewards and status 
is a powerful motivator of culture change in the military, and that “[t]he power of a 
mechanism that effects evaluations and promotions cannot be overstated.”). Even though 
“negative impact on promotion” is technically less severe than court-martial or nonjudicial 
punishment, it may seem more immediate and pressing to the average servicemember, who might 
see UCMJ punishment as remote or unlikely, and therefore be a better motivator of conduct.  
350 See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1153 (expressing concern about a perceived lack of due 
process for punitive reprimands in the Army).  
351 Department of Defense Equal Opportunity policy mandates a unit level investigation for 
unrestricted reports of sexual harassment. See DODI 1020.03, supra note 285, § 4.4(a)–(b), 
at 14 (Feb. 8, 2018) (instructing that within 72 hours of receiving a complaint of sexual 
harassment, the service members commanding officer will forward the complaint to their 
next superior officer who is authorized to convene a general court-martial and begin an 
investigation of the complaint); see also ARMY REG. 600-37, supra note 199, para. 3-4(d), at 
4 (specifying that notice and opportunity to respond must be given to recipients of GOMORs 
before a filing determination is made). 
352 This is based somewhat on the co-author Sagen Gearhart’s experience in the military, but 
nonjudicial punishment is commonly understood to be a limited punishment, whereas 
GOMOR’s are commonly understood to be very serious. See MCM, supra note 184, at V-2 
(outlining nonjudicial punishment process under the Uniform Code of Military Justice); see 
also Bojan, supra note 198, at 1175 (stating that filing a GOMOR in a soldier’s personnel 
file “has the same effect as a general officer saying, ‘[y]our career is over.’”).  
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As seen with DUI, stigma attaches to offenses where service members expect 
that GOMORs will be used. 
 
C. Remedies: Compensating Victims, Reining in Feres 
 
 Civilian employees who are sexually harassed can sue their 
employers for employment discrimination, for which compensatory and 
punitive damages, up to statutorily set limits, are available under Title VII.353 
This includes federal employees.354 Although not common,355 employees 
who are sexually harassed can also file tort claims against their employers or 
perpetrators.356 Remedies for sexual harassment (and assault) within the 
military justice system, in contrast, focus on disciplining the perpetrator. The 
UCMJ does not provide compensation for the victim or incentivize systemic 
accountability. As discussed previously,357 this regulatory framework 
excluding military personnel from the protections of civil rights and tort law 
is the result of federal courts’ interpretation of Title VII358 and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Feres v. United States,359 which federal courts have 
 
353 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3). Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to allow sex harassment 
victims to sue for compensatory and punitive damages. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Punitive damages are not 
available against the government, however. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).  
354 West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217 (1999) (holding that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the legal authority under § 2000e-16(b) of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they 
discriminate in employment in violation of Title VII). 
355 See Merle H. Weiner, Civil Recourse Insurance: Increasing Access to the Tort System for 
Survivors of Domestic and Sexual Violence, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 957, 974–84 (2020) (discussing 
difficulties survivors face pursing tort claims against perpetrators, mainly because lawyers will 
not take their cases); cf. Martha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #MeToo Moment?, 11 J. 
TORT L. 39, 45 (2018) (noting that tort claims against sexual assault perpetrators are rare). 
356 Joanna Stromberg, Comment, Sexual Harassment: Discrimination or Tort?, 12 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 317, 318 (2003) (advocating the use of assault and battery claims to challenge 
workplace sexual harassment). 
357 See supra notes 178–181 and accompanying text. 
358 The federal circuit courts to have considered the question have unanimously held that 
Title VII does not cover military service members, ostensibly based on concerns over military 
discipline and Congress’s inaction in reversing the judicially-created exemption, see sources 
cited supra note 174, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied review of the issue, 
including as recently as 2020. See Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. 
denied sub nom. Jackson v. Braithwaite, No. 20-19, 2020 WL 6829074 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2020); 
Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 959 (1988); Johnson 
v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S 986 (1978). 
359 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
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expanded over time to prohibit virtually all civil suits against the government 
by service members.360  
 The primary justifications for the Feres doctrine―that sexual 
misconduct claims will disrupt military discipline and that those who 
experience sexual harassment can be compensated with military 
benefits361―are especially unconvincing when applied to victims of sexual 
harassment. Military benefits are not designed to address the psychological 
and economic harms of sexual harassment, which are significant.362 Research 
finds extensive psychological effects, including depression, anxiety, panic 
disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder.363 One national study of 3,006 
 
360 In Feres, the Supreme Court held that uniformed members of the armed services may not 
bring suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries that “arise out of or are in the course 
of activity incident to service.” Id. Since then, the courts have expanded the doctrine to apply 
broadly to bar suits against the government for injuries sustained in many circumstances far 
removed from their military duties, including injuries sustained as a result of discrimination 
otherwise prohibited by Title VII and the Constitution. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 
296, 304–05 (1983) (barring constitutional claims for race discrimination); Martinez v. 
McCarthy, No. 20-1746-cv, 2020 WL 7579516, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2020) (barring Title VII 
sex and race-based discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 
F.2d 1219, 1223–24 (8th Cir. 1978) (barring Title VII race discrimination claim). 
361 Generally, compensation to injured service members is provided pursuant to the Veterans 
Benefits Act (BVA). See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 101–4335. 
362 See Gregory C. Sisk, The Peculiar Obstacles to Justice Facing Federal Employees Who 
Survive Sexual Violence, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 281 (“As with workers’ compensation 
generally, the VBA is not designed to address th[e] unique violation to personal dignity” 
caused by sexual violence). 
363 See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL 
SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 187–89 (2005) (reviewing research 
on psychological effects of sexual harassment); WILLIAM E. FOOTE & JANE GOODMAN-
DELAHUNTY, EVALUATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL 
CONSIDERATIONS IN FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS 130–31 (2005) (reviewing research on PTSD 
effects of sexual harassment); Bonnie S. Dansky & Dean G. Kilpatrick, Effects of Sexual 
Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 152, 166–69 
(William O’Donohue ed., 1997) (finding in a national study of more than 3,000 randomly 
sampled women that those who experienced sexual harassment were more likely to be 
diagnosed with a range of psychological disorders, including depression, anxiety, and 
PTSD); Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations: 
Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 30 
(1993) (citing studies on the psychological impacts of sexual harassment); Jason N. Houle, 
Jeremy Staff, Jeylan T. Mortimer, Christopher Uggen & Amy Blackstone, The Impact of 
Sexual Harassment on Depressive Symptoms During the Early Occupational Career, 1 
SOC’Y & MENTAL HEALTH 89, 101 (2011) (finding that harassment early in a person’s career 
has long-term effects on depressive symptoms in adulthood); Kimberly T. Schneider, 
Suzanne Swan & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Job-Related and Psychological Effects of Sexual 
Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED 
PSYCH. 401, 412–13 (1997) (finding that sexual harassment, even at relatively low 
frequencies, exerts a significant negative impact on psychological well-being; “harassment 
apparently does not have to be particularly egregious to result in negative consequences.”). 
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adults found that 21.9% of those surveyed who had experienced harassment 
that met the EEOC definition of sexual harassment were currently 
experiencing major depressive disorder.364 Although less well studied, 
research finds physical symptoms as well, including “stomach and appetite 
problems, sleep disorders, headaches, and crying spells, just to name 
some.”365 Economic and job effects of sexual harassment are also significant. 
According to one DOD survey, more than half of female and more than one-
third of male service members who experienced unwanted sexual contact or 
harassment indicated that they thought about getting out of their service due 
to the experience.366 Likewise, studies in the civilian context also find 
significant economic effects of sexual harassment, including being demoted, 
reassigned, or fired after reporting or quitting in response to harassment rather 
than reporting.367 
 Even accepting the basic principle of Feres that “the Government is 
not liable under the . . . Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise 
out of or are in the course of activity incident to service,”368 the idea that 
“service” should include the harms of sexual misconduct is at odds with any 
common or ordinary understanding of the term. Every current and former 
service member in the military understands that wearing a uniform comes with 
 
364 See Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 363, at 166. 
365 BEINER, supra note 363, at 187; see also Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 363, at 168 
(surveying studies finding health effects including headaches, gastroinstinal disturbance, 
sleep disturbance, fatigue, nausea, and weight loss). 
366 See 2012 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at 67–68. An earlier study of the military by 
independent researchers Magley and colleagues found similar results. Vicki J. Magley, Craig 
R. Waldo, Fritz Drasgow & Louise F. Fitzgerald, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on 
Military Personnel: Is It the Same for Men and Women?, 11 MIL. PSYCH. 283, 297 (1999) 
(finding that military personnel who were sexually harassed were less satisfied with work, 
colleagues, and supervisors; less committed to the military; and experienced reduced work 
productivity). 
367 Just to provide one very reliable example, the 2016 United States Merit System Protection 
Board Study of more than 42,000 federal employees found that during the two-year period 
from 2014 to 2016, as a consequence of sexual harassment, 17% of sexual harassment targets 
reported using annual leave; 17% reported using sick leave; 13% reported being denied a 
promotion, pay increase, good performance rating, or good reference; 6% transferred or quit; 
and 22% reported a decline in productivity. OFFICE OF POLICY AND EVALUATION, U.S. MERIT 
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, UPDATE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE: RESEARCH BRIEF 9 (2018), https://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs. 
aspx?docnumber=1500639&version=1506232&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/ 
SJ7L-TMRY]; U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, MERIT PRINCIPLES SURVEY 2016 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 3 (2016), https://www.mspb.gov/foia/Data/MSPB_MPS2016_ 
MethodologyMaterials.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4BB-YLSZ] (reporting response rate for the 
2016 Merit Systems Protection Principles Survey of federal employees); see also BEINER, 
supra note 363, at 10 (“One of the more reliable series of studies of working populations is 
that of the USMSPB.”) 
368 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
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risk, including giving one’s life, but it can hardly be said that sexual harassment 
and sexual assault are expected risks of military service, unless one is referring 
to the risk of rape by an enemy. Sexual harassment does not obviously advance 
any military mission and in fact undermines the effectiveness of the military 
given its negative impacts on job satisfaction and performance.369 
 The absence of an economic remedy also fundamentally undermines 
the DOD’s efforts to increase reporting of sexual misconduct.370 Without any 
meaningful remedy, service members have almost no incentive to report 
discrimination, all the more so in light of the common experience of retaliation 
for making a report.371 It is easy to see how the cost of reporting outweighs any 
potential personal or organizational benefits. Moreover, by undermining 
accountability, the Feres doctrine creates the ideal conditions for sexual 
harassment and other kinds of sexual misconduct to flourish in the military.372 
 To modernize the military justice system, military victims of sexual 
harassment (and other sexual misconduct, for that matter) should receive the 
same protections as civilian victims, including the ability to obtain compensatory 
damages. We note here that this proposal is not beyond the pale; there are 
multiple avenues to reign in Feres. More than one Supreme Court Justice has 
questioned Feres, including some of the Court’s more conservative members,373 
and the Court will soon decide whether to hear a case asking it to revisit the  
 
369 See NiCole T. Buchanan, Isis H. Settles, Angela T. Hall & Rachel C. O’Connor, A Review 
of Organizational Strategies for Reducing Sexual Harassment: Insights from the U. S. 
Military, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 687, 689 (2014) (“Sexual harassment affects the organization 
because targeted employees report decreased performance and organizational commitment, 
as well as increased withdrawal, turnover, and team conflict.”) (internal citation omitted).  
370 See discussion supra Sections II.B.1 and II.C.1. 
371 See sources cited supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text. 
372 See Dwight Stirling, The Feres Doctrine and Accountability, 1 J.L. POL’Y & MIL. AFF 1, 
3 (2019) (finding that the Feres doctrine has wrought “institutionalized lawlessness” in the 
military). 
373 See Daniel v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1713, 1714 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (“[D]enial of relief to military personnel and distortions of other areas of 
law to compensate [] will continue to ripple through our jurisprudence as long as the Court 
refuses to reconsider Feres.”); id. at 1713 (majority opinion) (“Justice Ginsburg would grant 
the petition for a writ of certiorari [in a case asking the Court to overturn the Feres 
doctrine].”); Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932, 932 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (reasoning that there is no support for Feres in the text of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act and that Feres “has the unfortunate consequence of depriving servicemen 
of any remedy when they are injured by the negligence of the Government or its 
employees.”); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700–01 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting, 
joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, J.J.) (“Feres was wrongly decided and heartily 
deserves the ‘widespread, almost universal criticism’ it has received.”) (quoting In re “Agent 
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). 
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doctrine.374 Moreover, in 2020, Congress took the first step by carving out a 
limited exception to the doctrine, providing for a settlement process run 
through the Department of Defense for certain tort suits against the military 
involving medical malpractice.375 If the Court does not weigh in to fix the 
injustice and overbreadth of Feres―which it unequivocally 
should―Congress could expand this new program to include an avenue for 
monetary compensation for service members who experience sexual assault 
and harassment.376   
n sum, the Feres doctrine does not serve the military’s mission, and 
by deterring reporting, it undermines the military’s efforts to address sexual 
harassment. As such, eliminating or at least narrowing this doctrine is crucial, 
along with removing sexual harassment investigations from the chain of 
command and utilizing administrative actions to punish sexually harassing 
conduct. If these changes were implemented alongside a dedicated penal 
article on sexual harassment, the UCMJ would more closely resemble civil 




Since World War II, the military has evolved significantly to reflect 
the demographics of the entire country as well as its societal and cultural 
norms. This progress was achieved through broader recognition and 
protection of service members’ individual rights, including their due process 
 
374 See Doe v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 2016, 2016 (2020) (granting motion to file petition 
for writ of certiorari). The case before the Court involves a young woman who was raped by 
a fellow cadet while on a walk one evening at West Point. According to briefs filed in the 
case, authorities at West Point failed to adequately respond to the reported rape and in fact 
encouraged the environment of sexual harassment that led to the student’s rape. Receiving 
no assistance with her ordeal, she withdrew from the academy and filed suit for damages 
against the U.S. government. See Brief of Federal Courts and Constitutional Law Professors 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 1, 22, Doe v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 2016 
(2020) (No. 20-559). 
375 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 731, 
133 Stat. 1198, 1457–60 (2019) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2733a). 
376 Or Congress could take more sweeping action and give service members the same civil 
rights protections and access to civilian courts as civilian employees. With President Biden’s 
election and democratic gains in the Senate, Senator Kristin Gillibrand announced that she 
is presently working with civil rights groups to draft such legislation. See Phil Stewart, 
Exclusive: Senator Gillibrand Eyes Extending Civil Rights Act Protections to U.S. Troops, 
REUTERS (Jan. 18, 2021, 2:59 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-civil-
rights-exclusive/exclusive-senator-gillibrand-eyes-extending-civil-rights-act-protections-to-
u-s-troops-idUSKBN29N1W8 [https://perma.cc/J2RF-SJ9R]. It is unclear whether Congress 
would pass such a law, however, given its sharp divisions. Id. As we have detailed in this 
Article, a compelling alternative is to permit the military to maintain an independent justice 
system but, in exchange, require the Department of Defense to provide functionally 
equivalent civil rights protections to military personnel. 
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rights377 and the rights of racial minorities, women, sexual minorities, and, 
most recently, transgender individuals, to be free of discrimination and fully 
integrated into the Armed Forces.378 Slowly, and with struggle, the military 
has modernized. Yet this process is unfinished. It is time for the Department 
of Defense to make good on its asserted commitment to sex and gender 
equality, propounded in its hundreds of reports, studies, investigations, and 
directives issued in the past thirty years. Confronting the military’s decades-
old problem with sexual assault and harassment is an urgent issue. 
Under Article I of the Constitution, the DOD maintains a separate 
justice system, largely insulated from the mandates of the civil and criminal 
justice systems that regulate civilians in the United States. The military’s 
separate legal order has too often reflected cultural and legal norms that are 
insufficiently concerned with individual rights. Women and other vulnerable 
groups are particularly at risk when separate legal systems such as the 
military’s embrace overtly racist, patriarchal, and homophobic ideals. In the 
case of sexual assault and harassment, the UCMJ and its legal processes lack 
core protections for victims, including the right to an independent investigation 
and adjudication of sexual assault and harassment complaints and the ability to 
receive compensation for injuries caused by sexual misconduct. 
The Secretary of Defense has the authority to prescribe policies and 
regulations for DOD employees, including those regulations pertaining to 
equal opportunity and nondiscrimination.379 Congress has the authority to 
establish qualifications for and conditions of service in the Armed Forces.380 
Military courts, authorized by Article I of the U.S. Constitution, have 
jurisdiction over cases involving military service members.381 Finally, 
constitutional rights identified by the Supreme Court generally apply to 
members of the military,382 with some limitations.383 Despite this extensive 
authority, none of these government institutions has held the military 
sufficiently accountable to the modern understandings or legal requirements 
of sex and gender equality. 
This gap between the civilian legal system and the military justice 
system has implications for both the military and American society. Sexual 
assault and harassment hinder recruitment, undermine service members’ 
 
377 See supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text. 
378 See discussion Part I, supra. 
379 5 U.S.C. § 301. 
380 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
381 10 U.S.C. §§ 803, 816–21.  
382 See ANNA C. HENNING. CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34697, SUPREME COURT APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION OVER MILITARY COURT CASES 4 (2009); KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 12–15. 
383 United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 208 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (rejecting a facial challenge 
to the UCMJ Article 125 criminalizing sodomy in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). Marcum involved a former Air Force sergeant 
convicted for engaging in consensual sex with men under his supervision. Id. at 200.  
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performance, and waste considerable administrative, legal, and intellectual 
resources, undermining the military’s overall effectiveness and mission. 
Ongoing tolerance of sex discrimination and sexual misconduct in the military 
also has societal-wide effects, perpetuating inequality in American society. 
The good news is that there is already a significant legal and 
administrative infrastructure in place enabling the military to modernize the 
military justice system to effectively deter, adjudicate, and punish sexual 
assault and harassment. Title VII’s statutory language and Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting Title VII are already reflected in DOD policies and 
directives. The UCMJ already provides for administrative punishments that 
utilize a civil burden of proof appropriate for sexual harassment claims. 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to set aside precedent that precludes 
compensating service members for torts and discrimination they may 
experience, more than one justice has signaled that the doctrine is ripe for 
reconsideration, and the DOD has started to make exceptions for certain 
injuries not incident to service. The military justice system can be modernized 
from the inside out. And indeed, it must if the military is to justify its 
continued independence from the civilian legal system. 
Taking a critical look at the military’s record on the matter of sexual 
misconduct should not be construed as an assertion that the Armed Forces are 
inherently objectionable, nor should we believe that critiques of the military 
are inherently unpatriotic. Such binary stances have become increasingly 
commonplace now that the average American has little affiliation with the 
military. Rather, the military is a cross section of America, with all of its 
strengths and weaknesses. It is this representative nature that makes the military 
a worthwhile focus of critical discussion and why we should care about how the 
military addresses sexual harassment and sexual assault.  
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